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CATV LEASED-ACCESS CHANNELS AND THE FCC:
THE INTRACTABLE JURISDICTION QUESTION
Paul J. Berman*
I. Introduction
Control over the channels of communications is a great source of power
in our society. The framers of the first amendment recognized this fact when
they guaranteed freedom of speech and press, the two means of information
dissemination of the day. Later governmental dealings with communications
channels have also attempted to ensure that control over communications chan-
nels is not abused. For example, when federal regulation of telephone and
telegraph companies was first legislated in 1910, concern was voiced that con-
trol over such important facilities and services not be lodged unchecked in the
hands of only a few private enterprises.1 Similarly, regulation of radio broad-
casting stems at least in part from the recognition that control over the "scarce"
resource of the radio spectrum carries with it a great deal of power.2
In 1934, the Communications Act consolidated the previously fragmented
regulation of electrical communications. Prior to the 1934 Act, communications
common carriers--then the telephone and telegraph companies-were regulated
by the Interstate Commerce Commission,3 and radio broadcasters were regulated
by the Federal Radio Commission.4 Since the 1934 legislation, new technologies
useful for the provision of communications and communications-related services
have been introduced. Television broadcasting has been made operational on a
large scale; communications satellite technologies have been deployed; computer
technologies are becoming increasingly intertwined with communications chan-
nels; and multichannel microwave and cable technologies have been developed
and installed. Of these it is perhaps CATV-Community Antenna TeleVision or
CAble TeleVision-that most seriously challenges the existing legal structure.
The important question is who will control the channels of communications: the
federal, state, or local governments, the owner of the CATV system or facility, or
the enterprise or citizen wishing to use the facility to communicate?
The history of the relationship between CATV and government is notable
for the absence of any formal congressional declaration of policy toward the
development of this new communications medium. The government regulatory
stance has instead been set by administrative agencies, particularly the Federal
* Member, District of Columbia Bar; J.D., Harvard, 1975. The author wishes to express
his gratitude for the advice and support for this article give by Prof. Anthony G. Octtinger,
Director, Harvard Program on Information Techniques and Public Policy.
1 45 CONG. REc. 5533 (1910) (remarks of Representative Bartlett).
2 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the
television broadcasting "equal time" requirement). "Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies
was left entirely to the private sector, and the result was chaos. It quickly became apparent
that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and
rationalized only by the Government ... ." Id. at 375-76.
3 Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544 (1910), amending Interstate Com-
merce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
4 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
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Communications Commission. The story of the FCC's arrogation of power over
CATV is important because the answer to the jurisdictional question is just as
elusive today as it was 15 years ago when the FCC first formally addressed
the question. CATV is a peg that will not easily fit into the holes provided by
the 40-year-old Communications Act. For example, some or all of the chan-
nels of a CATV system can be used to carry television broadcast signals to sub-
scribers' homes and offices. The CATV system receives television signals off-the-
air at the system antenna. The signals are received by a conventional television
antenna or, through the use of such techniques as microwave relay systems, the
signals may be imported to the CATV system from remote television markets.
Once received at the system antenna or "head-end," the broadcast signals are
carried simultaneously over different channels of the cable-just as many con-
ventional television channels are carried simultaneously over the air-to each
subscriber, who selects a channel to be viewed on his television set.
A CATV system may provide more than these "broadcast" channels. Other
channels of a CATV system can be leased by the CATV operator to virtually
anyone desiring to have his program carried over one or more channels of the
CATV cable to subscribers. Such a program can be recorded on a video tape
and then "played" at the CATV head-end at various times, depending on the
terms of the lease, or the program can originate "live" and be carried by "closed-
circuit" means such as cable and terrestrial or satellite relay to the CATV head-
end for carriage to subscribers according to the terms of the lease agreement.
These leased-access channels serve a function that is, in all its significant
qualitative aspects and legal attributes, communications common carriage.5
Thus, this article proposes as a model for regulation that these channels be
treated as communications common carrier channels. This model has been either
overlooked or avoided, but in any event has not been accepted by the FCC.
Against the standard provided by the model of communications common
carrier regulation incorporated into the Communications Act, the range of the
Commission's power over CATV leased-access channels is considerably shorter
than that actually asserted by the Commission. This lends insight into the
interests of at least some of the contenders for control over the development of
CATV. Treating leased-access CATV channels as communications common
carrier channels under the terms of the Communications Act of 1934 means that
regulation of at least some aspects of these channels would be moved from the
federal to the local or state level, diminishing the FCC's power. To the cable
operator, regulation of CATV by state and local authorities means a decrease
in power over his cable system. This is because exclusive federal regulation
5 The term "communications common carriage" often evokes the image of the public
switched telephone system, a nearly universal point-to-point communications facility. As will
be discussed at p. 181 infra, text accompanying notes 210-11, the characteristics of switched
circuits, point-to-point service and universal coverage are not necessary to the provision of
communications common carriage. Rather, the essential characteristics of a communications
common carrier involve nondiscriminatory reasonable access to the communications facility
provided by the carrier and lack of control by the carrier over the contents of the com-
munications carried. See Section III infra; Berman, Computer or Communications? Allocation
of Functions and the Role of the Federal Communications Commission, 27 FED. COMiUNmcA-
TIoN B.J. 161, 201-08 (1974).
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under current practices and budget constraints leaves the cable operator with
considerable discretion. Besides issues arising from the incursion of CATV into
the traditional forum of television broadcasters, who at present generally view
CATV as a communications competitor, the new offering of communications
common carrier services by CATV systems arouses the concern and the defenses
of the traditional communications common carriers, American Telephone and
Telegraph in particular, some of whose activities now become the concern of
CATV system owners as well. The interplay of these interests makes it difficult
for FCC regulation to achieve the announced goal of encouraging the use of
these channels for increased program diversity and wide-open public debate.
Viewing leased-access CATV channels as communications common carrier chan-
nels presents several issues not addressed by the FCC. The jurisdictional dif-
ficulties presented by questions of control over these communications channels
are severe. Thus, in light of the uncertain applicability of the 40-year-old
policy of the Communications Act to CATV, the strength of the political
interests involved, and the importance of the questions of allocation of social
power raised, congressional action is warranted.
II. FCC and the Cable: About Face
When CATV was first introduced in Lansford, Pennsylvania, and Astoria,
Oregon, the acronym stood for Community Antenna TeleVision. The tech-
nology was used to pick up television broadcast signals and relay them to homes
in areas remote from the actual broadcast station. As in the development of
radio broadcasting, CATV was pushed by receiver salespeople as a way of
extending the market and increasing the demand for television receivers.6 It was
all very simple-a big antenna, a cable to carry the signals, and drop lines
into the homes of the subscribers--so that people who bought television sets had
something to watch on them.
That motivation for CATV may sound absurd today, when television
broadcasting covers a large portion of the country. But in the late forties and
early fifties, the FCC imposed a freeze 6n the assignment of new television
licenses, thereby suspending the growth of television broadcasting pending an
FCC study of how to allocate radio frequencies throughout the country." Large
portions of the country had no television broadcast service prior to the freeze,
but by the end of the freeze in 1952, there were already 70 CATV systems,
serving approximately 14,000 subscribers.8
During this time, CATV was a boon to the broadcasters. It extended
television markets into areas the television signal did not otherwise reach. With
the lifting of the freeze, however, the situation began to change. FCC licensing
policy aimed at the development of at least one television service in every part
6 D. LEDuc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRisis IN MEDIA CONTROL (1973).
7 Report and Order "Freezing" Television License Applications, F.C.C. 48-2182 (Docket
Nos. 8736, 8975; Sept. 30, 1948).
8 Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79 HARv. L. RMv. 366, 368 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as Wire Mire]. See 43 TELEVISION FACT BooK 84-a (1974).
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of the country. The ultimate goal was the establishment of at least two broadcast
stations in every community.' Since the very high frequency (VHF)' television
spectrum was crowded, the FCC ostensibly relied on the development of broad-
casting in the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) range. But UHF broadcasting did
not develop as planned, and even after the VHF freeze was lifted, many parts
of the country continued to have television service provided to them only by
"repeater," "booster," or "statellite" stations. The only function of these
stations was to receive television signals and rebroadcast them; they engaged in
virtually no programming services. These "booster" operations, and local broad-
casters, began to perceive CATV as a threat. It was thought that CATV systems,
by importing television signals, diluted the markets of local and "booster" broad-
casters.
A. The Initial Decision Not to Regulate
The Commission was forced to confront the issue of the status of CATV
vis-a-vis the FCC by a complaint filed by Frontier Broadcasting, Inc. Frontier
was the leader of a group of rural, Western television broadcasters who asserted
that CATV systems were common carriers and, as such, were subject to regula-
tion under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934.1" In retrospect, the
broadcasters' motives seem clearly discernable: If CATV were regulated like a
telephone company-type common carrier, then the rate of return on investors'
capital would be limited and, presumably, investment in CATV systems would
also be limited. The FCC, however, decided that CATV systems as then oper-
ated were not communications common carriers. In reaching this decision, the
Commission either disregarded or was ignorant of the work of its own staff reach-
ing a contrary conclusion." The crucial issue in Frontier Broadcasting Co. v.
Collier, according to the Commission, was who controlled the content.
Fundamental to the concept of a communications common carrier is
that such a carrier holds itself out or makes a public offering to provide
facilities by wire or radio whereby all members of the public who choose
to employ such facilities and to compensate the carrier therefore may com-
municate or transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing between
the points on the system of that carrier and other carriers connecting withit. In other words, the carrier provides the means or ways of communication
for the transmission of such intelligence as the subscriber may choose to
have transmitted. The choice of the specific intelligence to be transmitted
9 Sixth Report and Order re Television Service (Docket Nos. 8736, 8975, 8976, 9175)3 17
Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952).
10 The Communications Act of 1934 is divided into six titles. Title I contains gen-
eral provisions, dealing with definitions and the general policy of the Act. Title II deals
with communications common carriers: telephone companies are the prime example. Com-
munications by radio is covered by Title III, the section specifically dealing with broadcasters.
Title IV provides for enforcement procedures and penalties. Title V contains administrative
procedures; and Title VI deals with miscellaneous subjects such as the effective date of the
Act, repeals of other duplicative legislation and the President's war powers.11 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Interstate
& Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3495-99 (1958).
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is, therefore, the sole responsibility or prerogative of the subscriber, and
not the carrier.12
From this definition of communications common carrier the Commission's
result was simple: Since the CATV system operator, not the subscriber, chose
which television signals were to be picked up and transmitted to the homes of
the subscribers, the CATV system was not a communications common carrier."3
Since the FCC did not provide the desired relief, the Western broadcasters
sought help from Congress. The Communications Subcommittee of the Senate
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee pressured the FCC to reconsider
its decision not to regulate CATV systems.' 4 A reconsideration came in the form
of a general inquiry into the effect of CATV on local broadcasters. The report
and order resulting from this inquiry, the 1959 Report and Order re CATV
and Repeater Services, reached the same result as Frontier, but for different
reasons. 5 Basically, four arguments were proposed by those favoring FCC
regulation of CATV systems: (a) the systems are involved in broadcasting;
(b) the systems are involved in communications common carriage; (c) the
FCC has plenary power to regulate interstate communications; and (d) the
FCC can regulate CATV systems which use microwave operations as a means
of relaying distant signals through the regulation of the microwave carrier. 6
The FCC found no basis in the Communications Act's provisions dealing with
broadcasting (Title III) and common carriage (Title II) which would support
an assertion of jurisdiction over CATV systems and, in so doing, reaffirmed
the Frontier decision.' Similarly, plenary power to regulate "any and all enter-
prises which happen to be connected with one of the many aspects of commu-
nications" was not found. Moreover, regulating CATV systems by controlling
the microwave carriers serving them was rejected as contrary to a Commission
rule against content restriction of common carriers 3 and because it was extending
12 Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 451, 454 (1958). One decision
has followed Frontier, noting that the legislative history is silent, or at best unhelpful, as to
the point in question. See Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 284
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
13 One might question whether this would have been the result reached by the Commis-
sion if the case had arisen after the Supreme Court's decision in Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS,
415 U.S. 394 (1974). In Teleprompter, discussed more fully in text accompanying notes 147-
153 infra, the issue was whether cable system importation of signals from remote television
markets, through the use of microwave relay facilities, subjected the cable system operator'to
copyright liability for the use of the programs so imported. The Court held that although the
cable system operator had some choice as to the television stations whose signals were to be
imported, such choice did not amount to enough control over the content of the signals carried
so as to constitute "origination" of programming. Hence, cable system operators would not
be subject to copyright liability for releasing imported television signals to the public.
14 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85TH CONG., 2D
SEss., THE PROBLEM OF TELEVISION SERvicE. FOR SMALLER COmmUNrIES (Comm. Print
1958).
15 Report and Order re Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV
Translators, TV "Satellite Stations" and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of
Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
16 FCC jurisdiction over microwave transmission systems is clear insofar as such systems
utilize the radio spectrum.
17 26 F.C.C. at 426-31.
18 The Commission, however, did not note the prohibition on the resale of communica-
tions common carriage services long incorporated into the tariffs of the common carriers. See,
e.g., American Telephone and Telegraph, F.C.C. Tariff No., 260, § 2.5. Although such
restrictions on the use of common carrier-provided channels of communications rests on
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FCC jurisdiction indirectly over the same CATV systems which the FCC felt it
could not regulate directly.19
Although the FCC concluded that it could not regulate CATV systems be-
cause the Communications Act of 1934 would not permit it,2" hindsight and close
evaluation of the 1959 Report and Order re CATV and Repeater Services in-
dicate a more practical political basis. The harm that CATV systems pose to
television broadcasters is evaluated before the jurisdictional question." Although
the FCC appeared to say it lacked power to regulate CATV systems, the 1959
Report and Order re CATV and Repeater Services actually concluded only that
regulation was unnecessary at the time, leaving potential future regulation a
possibility.
In short, it is argued, aside from the fact that CATV's are within
some of the definitions of the Communications Act (although their being
so makes the argument stronger) we can control them because of their
effect upon broadcasting, clearly an interstate business and one which we
are instructed to foster and lead to orderly maximum development.
Assuming this concept has legal validity (a point we believe is open to
question, and upon which it is unnecessary for us to pass) in order to
acquire jurisdiction on this basis, . . . we would have to make a finding
that in a certain situation, or in situations falling within certain limits, there
would be substantial adverse impact on the local station. We have expressed
above our inability to determine where the impact takes effect, although
we recognize that it may well exist. Accordingly, we would find it impos-
sible, from anything presented to us so far, to make the necessary finding,
either in a particular situation or generally.22
On second rebuff by the FCC, the Western broadcasters returned to Con-
gress, whereupon legislation to regulate CATV systems was introduced.22  By
economic analysis of the impact on communications services if the proscribed activity were
allowed, such restrictions have obvious second-order effects on the content of the communica-
tions that may be carried over common carrier channels.
19 26 F.C.C. at 428-31.
20 Id. at 441.
21 The unresolved issue is whether jurisdiction is discretionary, to be based on a Cor-
mission finding of fact. The strongest argument that the Commission has no discretion derives
from the terms of § 2(a) of the Communications Act itself, 47 U.S.C. § 152(a), which reads:
"The provisions of this Act shall apply to all interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio . . . which originates and/or is received in the United States. . ." (emphasis added).
In strict terms, then, the question for the FCC should have been only whether CATV was
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio. The question of "harm" affects only
the substance of the regulations. In contrast, it has been argued that the FCC's mandate,
enacted in 1939 under a restrictive interpretation of the commerce clause, was intended to
expand in scope according to Supreme Court interpretations of that clause. See Lyon, Old
Statutes and New Construction, 44 COLUM. L. Rav. 509 (1944). Thus, FCC jurisdiction
based on evaluation of "harm" to existing FCC-regulated services could be warranted.
22 26 F.C.C. at 431 (emphasis added).
23 Several pieces of legislation were originally introduced. S. 1886, introduced by Senator
Magnuson, would have required cable operators to obtain local station consent before carrying
any signals originating from those television stations and would have required CATV systems to
carry all local television signals. Senators Moss and Murray offered an amendment that would
have required FCC licensing of CATV systems based on FCC findings that no local stations
would be adversely affected. A less restrictive proposal, S. 2303, was submitted by Senator
Monroney; this bill would have only required CATV systems with more than 50 subscribers
to obtain certificates of "public convenience and necessity" from the FCC, but, while extend-
ing FCC authority over CATV systems, did not specify the content of FCC regulation.
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1960 compromise legislation was proposed,24 but at the last minute CATV system
owners and operators withdrew their support" and the bill was returned by a
39-38 vote to committee, where it died. Similar legislation, proposed in the fol-
lowing year, also failed. 6
Broadcast interests continued, however. As television broadcasting grew,
so did CATV27 and the allegations of its interference with television broadcasting.
The more broadcasters affected, the more protests were heard, and by 1962 the
FCC was ready to reconsider its decision not to regulate CATV.
B. Reversal: The Decision to Regulate
The first step through the door left open in 1959 came with the application
,of Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. for a permit to install a microwave
radio relay to pick up television signals and carry them to Carter's CATV sys-
tems in Wyoming.28 The FCC denied Carter's application until Carter could
demonstrate that its CATV operations would not duplicate the progamming of
the local television station. By imposing conditions to be met before the micro-
wave carrier permit issued, the FCC was for the time being regulating indirectly
what it had said only three years earlier it could not regulate directly.29 The
barriers which the FCC perceived in 1959 to CATV regulation must have
seemed transparent, if not invisible, in 1962 at the time of the Carter Mountain
decision; the 1959 Report and Order re CATV and Repeater Services was men-
tioned only in the opinion of dissenting Commissioner Cross. The FCC con-
struction of its mandate was upheld in 1963 by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v.
FCC.s0
Once the decision to regulate was made, regulatory policy had to be de-
veloped. Carter Mountain was followed by a Notice of Inquiry for a proposed
rulemaling to establish a Commission policy toward CATV.5' By the time the
Inquiry was finished in 1965 and the Report and Order re Microwave-Served
CATV ready, the CATV industry had changed significantly. By 1964, there
were 1300 CATV systems, serving more than 1.2 million homes; CATV sys-
tems were being established at the rate of more than one per day; the size of the
24 Senator Pastore proposed S. 2653, which incorporated the rebroadcast consent and
local carriage rules of S. 1886, supra note 23, added a requirement of nonduplication of
programming during certain time periods established by the FCC, and established a procedure
whereby challenges and hearings on CATV licenses held by the Commission could be open to
the public.
25 106 CoNG. REC. 10547 (1960) (remarks of Senator Mansfield).
26 "In the 87th Congress, the Commission proposed S. 1044, and H.R. 6840, which would
have expressly authorized the Commission to authorize rules for the protection of stations
providing locally originated television programs. These bills received no action. The Com-
mission proposed no legislation to the 88th Congress, and no action was taken on any bills."
Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking re CATV, 1 F.C.C.2d 453, 464 n.13(1965).
27 See Wire Mire, supra note 8, at 368.
28 In re Application of Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962),
aff'd sub nom. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
29 See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
30 Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
31 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 27 Fed. Reg. 12586 (1962).
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average city served by CATV had risen; and CATV was breaking into larger
markets with one or more established television broadcast outlets. The broad-
casters began to protest that continued CATV expansion portended the revolu-
tion of television broadcasting into a highly concentrated industry quite different
from its existing, locally-based structure. 2
The FCC's response to these developments came in the 1965 First Report
and Order re Microwave-Served CATV, which proposed as an initial matter
that the Commission had jurisdiction over CATV systems, whether or not they
used microwave transmission facilities to import television signals.3 " This 1965
First Report and Order re Microwave-Served CATV was accompanied by a
Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking re CATV which called
for comments on the jurisdictional issue. 4 These documents reflected the FCC's
perception that regulation was needed because an increasing number of markets
were being exploited by CATV. By 1966, the FCC's Second Report and Order
re CATV, 5 which both expanded on the 1965 First Report and Order re Micro-
wave-Served CATV and dealt with the issues propounded in the 1965 Notice
of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking re CATV, had lumped micro-
wave-served CATV systems together with CATV systems that did not rely on
microwave relay facilities. This 1966 Second Report and Order re CATV also
cited the Commission's commitment to the development of UHF broadcasting as
a reason for regulating CATV systems generally."
By the time of the 1966 Second Report and Order re CATV, the Com-
mission had decided to regulate all CATV systems, and set about to prove that
it had the necessary jurisdiction. This proof started with a Commission memo-
randum on its jurisdiction and authority attached as an appendix to the 1965
Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking re CATV," which was
again attached unaltered to the 1966 Second Report and Order re CATV.3
In that memorandum, the FCC actually asserted regulatory jurisdiction over
CATV systems, whether or not served by microwave carriers. After reciting
the purpose of the Communications Act of 1934"9 and the definitions of com-
munications by wire and radio provided in the 1934 Act, 0 the memorandum
provided jurisdictional justification for the FCC regulations promulgated:
32 Wire Mire, supra note 8, at 386.
33 First Report and Order re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 685 '(1965).
34 Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking re CATV, 1 F.C.C.2d 453
(1965).
35 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
36 The wisdom of this commitment is questioned in Chazen & Ross, Federal Regulation
of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 1820 (1970).
37 1 F.C.C.2d 453, 478-82 (1965).
38 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 793-97 (1966).
39 See Communications' Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
40 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(a)-(b) '(1970): "'Wire communi-
cations' or 'communications by wire' means the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures
and sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, cable, or other like connection, between the points of
origin and reception of such transmission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus,
and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications)
incidental to such transmission."
"'Radio communication' or 'communication by radio' means the transmission by
radio of writing, signs, signals pictures and sounds of all kinds, including all instrumentalities,
facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding-and delivery
of communications) incidental to such transmission."
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From the plain language of these definitions, there would seem to be
no question but that CATV systems are engaged in interstate communi-
cations by wire or radio.... CATV systems constitute interstate communi-
cation by wire, since they form a connecting link in the chain of communi-
cation between the point of origin (the transmitting station) and reception
by the viewing public (the CATV subscriber)-a chain which "is now well
established . . . as interstate communication'. . . CATV systems are
extensions of the interstate service of the television broadcast stations whose
signals they carry, . . . and hence constitute "interstate communication by
wire" to which the provisions of the act are applicable.41
This rationale for FCC jurisdiction over CATV systems was upheld by the
Supreme Court. FCC jurisdiction to regulate CATV systems was challenged
and upheld in 1968 in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.42 The Court
held that the Commission's authority over "all interstate... communication by
wire or radio" permits regulation of CATV systems.4
The use of the term "CATV" in the Court's opinion is unfortunate. By the
time of the Southwestern decision, CATV had begun a transformation from
Community Antenna TeleVision to Cable Television. CATV servies were not
limited to the simultaneous retransmission of television signals received "off-the-
air." New services, beginning with relatively simple arrangements for trans-
mitting weather data, or for showing the AP wire or the Dow Jones ticker, were
included. These services did not rely on the broadcasters for programming."
They might have used the same cable that the television retransmissions used,
but they exploited the potential of the cable technology to provide many channels
simultaneously.
It is therefore important to understand precisely what the Court held in
Southwestern. The opinion quite clearly dealt only with CATV systems insofar
as they carry signals of television broadcast stations.
CATV systems perform either or both of two functions. First, they
may supplement broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory reception of local
stations in adjacent areas in which such reception would not otherwise be
possible; and second, they may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant
stations entirely beyond the range of local antennae.
45
In holding that the FCC had authority to regulate CATV systems as "an-
cillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities
for the regulation of television broadcasting," 48 the Court validated FCC juris-
diction over only those two functions:
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Com-
41 1 F.C.C.2d at 479, 2 F.C.C.2d at 793. This particular rationale for FCC jurisdiction
over CATV channels that carry signals that originate at television broadcast antennas was
validated in General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888
(1969), discussed fully with text accompanying notes 133-140 infra.
42 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
43 Id. at 178.
44 LnDuc, supra note 6, at 157.
45 392 U.S. at 163.
46 Id. at 178.
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mission's authority to regulate CATV... We express no views as to the
Commission's authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any other circum-
stances or for any other purposes.4 7
Any lingering doubt that the Court was dealing with any other functions that
CATV systems might perform is removed by the limiting language setting forth
the scope of the case in the United States' (and the FCC's) brief:
It seems plain, therefore, that the statutory powers given the Com-
mission are ample to authorize its regulation of the carriage of television
signals by CATV systems. Indeed, that is the only aspect of CATV opera-
tions over which Commission authority has been asserted. No attempt has
been made to franchise or otherwise regulate entry into the CATV business,
nor to fix CATV rates or limit the number of systems which can operate
in a particular area.48
The substantive rules promulgated in the 1966 Second Report and Order,
and approved in Southwestern, had the effect of freezing CATV expansion in
the top 100 television markets by prohibiting CATV importation of television
signals from outside the market. The action was drastic and prompted con-
gressional study, but with the same political forces at work in Congress as at
the Commission, it is not surprising that the resulting proposed legislation incor-
porated FCC suggestions as to the substance of CATV regulation."' As with
other congressional attempts to deal with CATV, the bill was not enacted; in
fact, it never reached the floor for debate. 0 By now the initiative over CATV
had clearly shifted, and the FCC would act until stopped by the Congress.
C. New Issues in Regulation: Program Origination
The regulation the FCC had imposed, while designed to alleviate (if only
by postponing) some confrontations, raised other issues. CATV system owners
in those markets where signal importation was banned turned to originating
their own programming. This activity was undertaken despite claims that it
constituted pay-TV or that it threatened the broadcaster's hegemony in the
program production market. In the 1969 First Report and Order re CATV
Program Origination,5 the FCC addressed the claims squarely, and promulgated
yet more rules. These required that CATV systems with more than 3,500 sub-
scribers 2 provide some original programming as of January 1, 1971, and are
thus called the Program Origination rules.
Most significantly, the 1969 Program Origination rules, as well as the 1969
First Report and Order re CATV Program Origination, reflected a change in
FCC attitude toward CATV. No longer was CATV merely something "ancil-
47 Id.
48 Brief for Appellees at 42. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968).
49 H.R. 13286, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
50 LEDUC, supra note 6, at 158.
51 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
52 These CATV systems, because they are larger, of course are perceived to have a greater
effect on television audiences.
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lary to broadcasting." Rather, cable television was seen as providing an indepen-
dent means of communications. " The FCC began to address some of the issues
presented by the fact that uses of CATV other than the retransmission of broad-
cast signals (i.e., "nonbroadcast" uses) could serve the long-standing and well-
articulated policy that "the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."5
It was at this important juncture, in the 1969 First Report and Order re
CATV Program Origination, that the FCC addressed the notion that, by allow-
ing programs produced by other than traditional broadcasters or CATV oper-
ators to be carried over CATV systems without any control over program con-
tent by the CATV operators, CATV systems might serve important policy in-
terests by disseminating information from diverse and antagonistic sources.
Recognizing that the crucial issues are those of access and control over the con-
tent of the communications carried, the Commission suggested that over some
channels, the CATV operator should exercise no control over content. Over
these channels, the CATV operator would act like the communications common
carrier described in Frontier Broadcasting:55
[t]he public interest would be served by encouraging CATV systems to
operate as common carriers on some channels in order to afford an outlet
for others to present programs of their own choosing, free from any control
of the CATV operator as to content (except as required by the Com-
mission's rules and applicable law), and to provide other communications
services.... From a diversity standpoint, it seems beyond dispute that one
party should not control the content of communications on so many chan-
nels into the home.... In light of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the
public interest would be served by encouraging CATV systems to operate
as common carriers on some channels.50
Even though the declarations of the public interest are clear and strong, the
FCC chose to wait until further study to impose rules requiring such common
carrier operation."
Thus, the 1969 Program Origination rules basically require CATV systems
with more than 3,500 subscribers, as a condition to carrying the signals of any
television station, to operate to a significant extent as a local outlet by providing
"cablecasting." As defined in the FCC's 1969 Program Origination Rules,
cablecasting is "programming distributed on a CATV system which has been
originated by the CATV operator or by another entity, exclusive of broadcast
signals carried on the system." 5 It was the FCC's intention that this program
53 Comment, Federal and State Regulation of Cable Television: An Analysis of the New
FCC Rules, 1971 DuxE L.J. 1151, 1168 [hereinafter cited as New Rules Analysis].
54 20 F.C.C.2d at 205, citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Corp., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Goodwill Stations v. FCC, 325 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
55 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
56 20 F.C.C.2d at 202, 205, 207.
57 Id. at 207.
58 20 F.C.C.2d at 223 (47 C.F.R. § 74.1101, 1111, rePealed, 36 F.C.C.2d 212 (1972)).
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origination requirement help ensure that program origination facilities would also
be available for use by those desiring to originate programs on channels which
the CATV operator would lease to them. 9 To encourage such activity, the FCC
also required the CATV operator to make facilities available for local produc-
tion and presentation of programs other than automated services."0 Although in
subsequent regulations the "common carrier" language is almost completely
abandoned, the rules subsequently promulgated by the Commission incorporate
the policies outlined in the 1969 First Report and Order re CATV Program
Origination.6
It was this "local origination" requirement that prompted the second serious
challenge to FCC regulation of cable television. The program origination rule
clearly represented a substantial expansion of the FCC's jurisdiction over
CATV.62 The challenge finally reached the Supreme Court in United States v.
Midwest Video,6" in which the "controversy . . . [centered] on whether the
Commission's program origination rule is 'reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of [its] various responsibilities for the effective regulation of tele-
vision broadcasting.'" Significantly, the issue of jurisdiction to regulate CATV
was not litigated by the parties in the case.
The parties before us do not dispute that in light of Southwestern CATV
transmissions are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction as 'interstate ...
communication by wire or radio' within the meaning of § 2(a) [of the
Communications Act of 1934] even insofar as they are local cablecasts. 64
The Court decided by a plurality of four. Reversal of the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit required the concurrence of the Chief Justice, who was
severely troubled by the issue of jurisdiction, as reflected in his separate opinion:
Candor requires acknowledgement for me at least that the Commission's
position strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive juris-
diction that has evolved by decision of Commission and the courts.65
The plurality of the Court, however, did address in a lengthy footnote the
issue of whether or not the FCC had jurisdiction to require program origination.
59 20 F.C.C.2d at 209.
60 Id. (47 C.F.R. § 74.1111, repealed, 36 F.C.C.2d 212 (1972)).
61 This changing of labels while maintaining of substance was not lost on the Supreme
Court:
Although the Commission did not impose common-carrier obligations on
CATV systems in its 1969 report, it did note that "the origination requirement will
help insure that origination facilities are available for use by others originating on
leased channels." Public access requirements were introduced in the Commission's
Report and Order on Cable Television Service, although not directly under the
heading of common-carrier service. See Report and Order on Cable Television
Service.
36 F.C.C.2d 143, 212 (1972).
62 Note, Cablecasting: Myth or Reality--Authority of the Federal Communications
Commission to Regulate Local Program Origination on Cable Television-An Evaluation
of the Commission's Cablecasting Rules After United States v. Midwest Video Corporation,
26 RUTGERs L. Rav. 804, 817 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rules Evaluation].
63 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
64 Id. at 662-63.
65 Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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At bottom, CATV systems are subject to FCC regulation, said the Court, be-
cause the FCC can condition the carriage of broadcast signals on the origination
of programming. Furthermore,
[t]he devotion of CATV systems to broadcast transmission-together with
the interdependencies between that service and cablecasts, and the necessity
for unified regulation-plainly suffices to bring cablecasts within the Com-
mission's § 2(a) jurisdiction.68
D. Regulation of Local Incidents
In the meantime, the Commission did not even wait for the Court's deci-
sion in Midwest Video before suggesting, 7 and then promulgating," yet another
set of regulations dealing more fully with the "local incidents" of CATV. Local
incidents are the aspects of CATV that can be separated from the function of
carrying the signals of broadcast stations. They include the franchising process
at the local level, the rates subscribers are charged, and the existence of capa-
bility for other communications services. The new Cable Rules, when proposed by
the FCC, attempted to reach a compromise between industry interests and ad-
vocates of the public interest.69 However, the Commission's proposal failed to deal
with some critical issues concerning copyright liabilities. These questions were
addressed, and answers formulated, in a series of ciosed-door meetings involving
the National Cable Television Association, the National Association of Broad-
casters, the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, and attorneys repre-
senting copyright proprietors' interests." The meetings were held not under
the auspices of the FCC, but rather under the newly formed Office of Tele-
communications Policy. OTP had been called into action by the parties to
the meetings, by congressional inactivity and by its own youthful desire to
establish itself as an important force in communications policy formulation.71
Although the National Cable Television Association was unhappy with the
compromise reached, there was no guarantee that the FCC would accept
NOTA counterproposals, and worst of all, the broadcasters might use their
political leverage at the congressional level to explode the whole problem into
a wide-open congressional debate.7 2 Under such pressures the agreement was
signed by the industry-group figures, and the FCC accepted the consensus agree-
ment in its entirety. Commissioner Johnson dissented, claiming that "the FCC
66 Id. at 663 n.21.
67 In re Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d 115
(1971).
68 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
69 R. Berner, Constraints on the Regulatory Process: A Case Study of Regulation of
Cable Television, June 15, 1975 (unpublished undergraduate honors thesis, Harvard College;
to be published by the Harvard Program on Information Technologies and Public Poli in
1975).
70 Gerlach, Toward a Wired Society: Prospects, Problems and Proposals for a National
Policy on Cable Technology, 25 M.mn L. Rzv. 193 (1973).
71 Berner, supra note 69, at ch. 3.
72 Id.
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has, in effect, abandoned its role as a formulator of policy and interpreter of law
for that of political pundit."'"
Throughout the progress of the consensus agreement negotiations, however,
the substance of the rules dealing with nonbroadcast channels remained the
same. As promulgated in February of 1972, in the Cable Television Report
and Order,74 the Cable Rules establish a hierarchy of cable channel uses. First,
the rules require of cable systems in the top 100 television markets that for
each cable system channel that is used to carry programs received from television
broadcasts off-the-air, the system must provide one channel suitable for trans-
mission of signals which do not involve any over-the-air broadcasting."' The
Rules then proceed to establish requirements for specific uses for these non-
broadcast channels, and a structure as to when these uses are to be served:"
A. Dedicated Channels
1. Public Access: To encourage public debate cable systems are required
to maintain at least one specially designated, noncommercial public
access channel available on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis.
2. Education: To encourage education, cable systems are required to
maintain at least one specially designated channel for use by local
educational authorities.
3. Government: Cable systems are required to maintain at least one
specially designated channel for local government uses (cablecasting
local city council meetings, civic events, etc.)
B. Leased Access Channels
After the above requirements have been satisfied, the cable operator is
to offer other non-broadcast channel capacity (i.e. channels not used to
carry television signals received off-the-air) for lease to third parties
on a time-slot or permanent basis. On at least one such channel, priority
is to be given to part-time users.
C. Priority for Dedicated Channels
Leased access operations may only be undertaken with the express
understanding that they are subject to displacement if there is a demand
to use the channels for their specially designated purposes.
Finally, in an effort to ensure that there will always be enough channel capacity
to meet demand, the 1972 Cable Rules require that when a cable system is used
to a specified high degree, more channel capacity must be made available."'
73 36 F.C.C.2d at 317 (Johnson, Cram'r, dissenting).
74 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
75 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(1)-(2) (1975).
76 The structure of this table is taken from Gerlach, supra note 70. at 229. The substance
is from 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1975).
77 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(8) (1975).
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For all of the FCC's arguments that these nonbroadcast channels will be
used in such a manner as to vindicate the important right of access to communi-
cations media,"8 the rules governing these channels are full of "jokers, open man-
holes, and assorted loopholes."79 Many of these problems stem in full or in part
from the fact that, in precluding state and local regulation of the operation of
these channels, the FCC has placed a good deal of power in the hands of the
CATV system owner or operator. The interests of the owner or operator might
not always be congruent with those of the users of these nonbroadcast channels. 0
First, with regard to expansion of capacity when the cable system reaches the
specified saturation level, it is unclear whether the FCC rules (whose history
provides excuse from the expansion requirement if unduly burdensome)," and
the FCC itself, are "tough enough" to enforce the rules with the vigor needed to
ensure that cable channels do not become a "scarce" resource as are television
channels.8 2 Moreover, it has been observed that by carefully timing tests of the
amount of use of his system, a cable operator can evade the thrust of the regula-
tion requiring increases in channel capacity to be implemented when the system's
specified "saturation point" is reached.8"
Second, because state and local regulation of almost all the operation of
nonbroadcast channels is precluded and the federal regulations ambiguous, the
cable system operator himself maintains substantial control over the access to
nonbroadcast channels, as well as control over the prices charged for the use of
the channel and any studio equipment used to produce programming. 4 Ad-
78 The growth of the "right to access" in the literature and the cases is excellently
documented and discussed in Gerlach, supra note 70, at 222-28.
79 Id. at 230.
80 Barnett, State, Federal, and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NoTaR DAM
LAWYER 685, 745 (1972).
81 "If it were necessary to rebuild or add extensive new plant, this could not be reason-
ably expected within the six-month period [specified in the rules]. The requirement for
activating capacity within 6 months is based on our understanding that only relatively modest
effort is involved in converting existing potential to actual capacity." Cable Television Report
and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 192.
82 Gerlach, supra note 70, at 231. Gerlach's suggestion, see text accompanying note that
the FCC is not "tough enough" to enforce the CATV rules to make sure that leashed-access
channels do not become a "scarce" resource, is already being supported by Commission-
provided evidence. The 1972 Cable Rules provided that systems then in operation had until
1977 to comply with the rules in 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 requiring 20-channel capacity; the
availability of an equivalent amount of bandwidth for nonbroadcast purposes for each broad-
cast channel used; technical capacity for some return communications; a single channel for
public, educational, local government, and leased-channel use; such capacity to be expanded
on need; and equipment and facilities necessary for the production of programming on the
public access channel. On July 9, 1975, however, the Commission was persuaded to cancel
the 1977 deadline for reconstruction of CATV systems to meet the requirements of the non-
broadcast channel rules in 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (1)-(8) by arguments that (a) the industry
lacked the capital to provide any reconstruction; (b) more than the five years between
1972 and 1977 would be needed to generate the necessary revenue; and (c) financial in-
terests would not extend credit because of the state of the economy and the perception of
CATV reconstruction as a poor investment. Cable Television Service-Access Channels,
34 P & F Radio Reg. 723 (1975). The FCC could only promise to explore alternatives to
"deadline" rebuilding in its pending Docket 20508. Id. at 736. The end result may well
be that on some cable systems "grandfathered" under the 1972 Rules, leased-access chan-
nels-perhaps even all channels-are or will soon become "scarce."
83 Rules Evaluation, supra note 62, at 827.
84 Barnett, supra note 80, at 745; Gerlach, supra note 70, at 232; Rules Evaluation, supra
note 62, at 832-33; Note, Toward Community Ownership of Cable Television, 83 YAx L.J.
1708, 1712 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Community Ownership].
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ditionally, there is no meaningful definition or delineation of the equipment
that a cable system must make available in order to meet the requirement that it
operate to a substantial degree as a local programming outlet.8"
Because most cable systems are local monopolies (because it appears a
priori wasteful to dig up streets for a second system)," the FCC found it neces-
sary to impose limits on the control the cable owner may exercise over the
content of the communications carried over these nonbroadcast channels.
Specifically, in close analogy to the common carrier defined in Frontier Broad-
casting: 
8 7
Each such system shall exercise no control over program content on any
of the channels [used for nonbroadcast services], however, this limitation
shall not prevent it from taking appropriate steps to insure compliance with
the operating rules described [below.]s s
The "operating rules" further limit the uses of these nonbroadcast channels s. 8
But, importantly, the rules require that, with regard to the public access and
other leased-access channels, access be afforded on a first-come, first-served
basis.9
Once the Commission began to deal with the local incidents of cable tele-
vision, it had also to deal with the local incidents of cable television regulation.9
While the federal-state-local relationships dictated by the FCC with regard to
most aspects of cable regulation are delineated in a separately labelled section of
the 1972 Cable Rules,92 those rules dealing with regulatory control over non-
broadcast channels are embedded in the substantive regulations themselves:
Except on specific authorization, or with respect to the operation of the
local government access channel, no local entity shall prescribe any other
rules concerning the number or manner of operation of access channels .... 13
This means that as of the effective date of the 1972 Rules, the FCC has pre-
empted state and local regulation with respect to most nonbroadcast channels.
The justification for this action was based on FCC predictions of the confusion
and impracticality that would be generated by more than one level of regulation.
There remains the issue of whether also to permit state or local regulation
85 Rules Evaluation, supra note 62, at 829.
86 But see Riverside Cable Corp., 42 F.C.C.2d 783 (1973), in which the Commission
found itself without ability to deal with the second of two cable systems in the city of Perris,
California, where that second system carried no broadcast signals.
87 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
88 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (9) (1975) (emphasis added).
89 For public-access channels, the cable system is required to establish rules requiring
first-come, nondiscriminatory access; and to prohibit the presentation of advertising material
for commercial purposes, lottery information, or obscene or indecent material. Additionally,
the list of all persons requesting access time must be made public. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)
(11) (i) (1975). With regard to leased channels, the operating rules are the same, except that
commercial advertising is not barred. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (11) (iii) (1975).
90 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(11)'(i), (iii) (1975).
91 Barnett, supra note 80, at 685; New Rules Analysis, supra note 53, at 1161.
92 47 C.F.R. Pt. 76, Subpt. C. (1972).
93 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(11)(iv) (1975).
[December 1975]
[Vol. 51:145] CATV LEASED-ACCESS CHANNELS AND THE FCC 161
of these channels where not inconsistent with federal purposes. We think
that in this area a dual form of regulation would be confusing and im-
practicable. Our objective of allowing a period for experimentation might
be jeopardized if, for example, a local entity were to specify more restrictive
regulations than we have prescribed. Thus, except for the government
channel, local regulation of the access channels is precluded. If experience
and further proceedings indicate its need or desirability, we can then
delineate an appropriate local role. 4
Perhaps even more significantly, the FCC once again addressed the problem
of whether or not it even had jurisdiction over these nonbroadcast channels.
Again, the Commission chose not to rely solely on a theory of plenary FCC power
over communications" and, with regard to access channels presenting non-
broadcast programnuing, chose not to rely solely on a theory that these channels
were "ancillary to broadcasting."9 Instead, in a statement reflecting the weak-
nesses of these bases for asserting regulatory jurisdiction, the Commission
provided further specific elaboration:
We now turn to the question of the regulation of access channels presenting
non-broadcast programming. We believe that such regulation is properly
the concern of this Commission. These channels fulfill Communications Act
purposes and are integrally bound up with the broadcast signals being
carried by the cable. It is by no means clear that the viewing public will be
able to distinguish between a broadcast program and an access program;
rather the subscriber will simply turn the dial from broadcast to access pro-
gramming, much as he now selects television fare. Moreover, leased channels
will undoubtedly carry interconnected programming via satellite or interstate
terrestrial facilities, matters that are clearly within the Commission's juris-
diction. Finally, it is this Commission that must make the decisions as to
conditions to be imposed on the operations of pay cable channels, and we
have already taken steps in that direction.... Federal regulation is thus
clearly called for.
9 7
Finally, the most significant difficulty with regard to the nonbroadcast
channels stems from the fact that the cable operator may potentially face legal
liability based on the content of the communications carried over these nonbroad-
cast channels. Although the FCC rule provides that the cable operator shall have
no control over the content of the programming, the FCC could not promise
the cable operator that he would be free from libel liability based on the pro-
gramming carried over nonbroadcast channels."' The FCC could only indicate
that it was confident that any speech on access channels would be protected
under the reasoning of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.9" because, the Com-
mission assumed, "most users will presumably air opinions on matters that are of
94 36 F.C.C.2d at 193.
95 Barrow, The New CATV Rules: Proceed on Delayed Yellow, 25 VmW. L. Rzv. 681,
701 (1975).
96 See text accompanying note 53 supra.
97 36 F.C.C.2d at 193.
98 Rules Evaluation, supra note 62, at 829.
99 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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at least as much 'public or general interest' as in the Rosenbloom case.' '10
Furthermore, since the cable operator has, under FCC rule, no control over the
content of the communication, it would be impossible, stated the FCC, for such
an owner to have actual malice.10'
In case Rosenbloom and its progeny did not provide adequate protection,
however, the FCC asserted that the no-censorship requirement was a "valid
regulation having the 'force of law.' ,,102 But this self-serving assertion most likely
provides little comfort to the cable operator who will note that under the FCC's
admittedly pervasive jurisdiction over television broadcasting, the Communica-
tions Act does not entirely preempt the field.'
It was with regard to the control over content of these nonbroadcast, public,
and leased-access channels that the FCC began to confront the boundary beyond
which it could not by itself extend the Communications Act. Recognizing that
it was doubtful whether the FCC had the power to provide immunity from
state libel laws without any Congressional statement on the matter, the FCC
stated, "[I]f a problem should develop in this respect, it is readily remedied by
Congress and.., we would welcome clarifying legislation."' 4 Where Congress
has acted, enacting the "equal time" section of the Communications Act, federal
immunity from state liability for statements made during an "equal time"
broadcast allowed pursuant to the statute was implied.'0 There is no such
congressional statement with regard to cable television.'
Until such legislation is passed, cable system operators who feel that
federal case law and the FCC rules offer inadequate protection may prescreen
nonbroadcast programming, censoring those deemed objectionable.' Pre-
sumably, an opinion from a conservative counsel will allow control of the content
of nonbroadcast programming to revert to the cable system operator. Operator-
independent programning may thus be deterred, and the policy of decentralizing
the control over the content of the programming that is carried by all of those
cable channels into the home thus undermined.
E. Program Origination Reconsidered
In the meantime, during the court battle over the local origination require-
ment and the promulgation of the 1972 Cable Rules, the Commission began the
process of reversing itself with respect to the very regulation finally tested by the
Supreme Court in Midwest Video. The Commission had stayed the local origi-
nation requirement after the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit struck down
100 36 F.C.C.2d at 195.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 196.
103 Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 '(1963) (state
law prohibiting the advertisement of prices for optical services applicable to television broad-
caster whose signals were received in New Mexico).
104 36 F.C.C.2d at 196.
105 Farmers' Educ. & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
106 Rules Evaluation, supra note 62, at 836.
107 Id., noting that even though cable systems in New York require access channel users
to promise to indemnify the systems for libel, operators still prescreen all programs.
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the regulation 08 in the decision subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court in
Midwest Video. Even with Supreme Court afirmnance of the program origina-
tion rule, however, the stay was not lifted by the Commission.
Our hesitancy to remove the stay has resulted from a state of uncertainty-
not as to jurisdiction or authority, but as to the basic propriety of rein-
stating the rule as it is presently constituted. 0 9
But this was the critical question to the plurality in Midwest Video:
[W]hether the Commission has reasonably determined that its origination
rule will "further the achievement of long-established regulatory goals in
the field of television broadcasting by increasing the number of outlets for
community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs
and types of services.""u 0
The Supreme Court plurality in Midwest Video found that the Commission
had so reasonably determined. But by the end of 1974, only a year and a half
after the Midwest Video decision, the Commission was ready to reverse itself,
finding that its rule would not do the job.
['Tjhe Commission has concluded that the mandatory origination scheme
is not likely to be the most effective means of fostering local expression."'
Thus, the FCC repealed the mandatory origination requirement in its December
1974 Report and Order re Program Origination by Cable Television Systems."2
The repeal of the rule was based on the Commission's conclusion that
imposing mandatory origination rules is unlikely to best serve our cable-
casting goal. Quality, effective, local programming demands creativity and
interest. These factors cannot be mandated by law or ontract."3
The conclusion of the Commission in 1974 was actually presaged by Justice
Douglas, who authored the opinion for the four dissenting Justices in Midwest
Video.
CATV is simply a carrier having no more control over the message content
than does a telephone company. A carrier may of course seek a broad-
caster's license; but there is not the slightest suggestion in the Act or in its
history that a carrier can be bludgeoned into becoming a broadcaster while
all other broadcasters live under more lenient rules. There is not the slight-
est cue in the Act that CATV carriers can be converted into broadcasters.1 4
108 Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406
U.S. 649 (1972).
109 Report and Order re Program Origination by Cable Systems, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
110 406 U.S. at 667-68.
111 49 F.C.C.2d at 1104.
112 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
113 Id. at 1105.
114 406 U.S. at 680 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The 1974 Report and Order re Program Origination by Cable Television
Systems did, however, reinforce an earlier step taken in the direction of requiring
cable system operators to act as communications common carriers with regard
to nonbroadcast channels. Instead of requiring the cable operators to originate
programming, the FCC requires that as of January 1, 1976, operators of cable
systems with more than 3,500 subscribers make programming and origination
facilities available to the public on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis."5 The
rules elaborate the requirement in the repealed 1972 program origination rule
that the cable system have available facilities for local production and presen-
tation of programs. The new rules also specify that the cable operator is to
have no control over the content of nonoperator cablecast programs, except as
needed to ensure compliance with the operating guidelines set forth by the
Commission." 6
The 1974 rules require cable systems to operate in a manner strikingly like
the communications common carriers described in Frontier Broadcasting."7
Nevertheless, the Commission specifically disavowed common carrier regulation
in its 1974 Report and Order re Cable Program Origination by Cable Television
Systems so as to enable the cable system operator to engage in programming if
he so chooses. By so doing, however, the Commission again leaves the cable
system operator in potential conflict with those who would lease the channels or
use the program production facilities."' And again, by preempting local regu-
lation of nonoperator cablecast channels and facilities," 9 the Commission effec-
tively delegates a great deal of discretion to the cable operator in the implemen-
tation of the FCC's rules. Indeed, the Commission specifically so provides:
The equipment availability rule is designed to foster diverse local expression.
Thus, no one person or group can claim priority or exclusive use. Any
charges for equipment use must be consistent with our goal of affording
the public a low cost means of television access. Reasonable rules developed
by the operator against abuse or damage to equipment and compensation
for same are to be expected. We leave this up to the operator .... 120
The uncertainty about the scope of federal authority and the scope of state
115 47 C.F.R. § 76.253 (1975).
116 47 C.F.R. § 76.253(b) (2) '(1975). The operating rules are set out in the following
subsection (b) (3):
(3) Operating rules. (i) Each such system shall establish rules requiring first-come
non-discriminatory availability of equipment and bandwidth; prohibiting the presen-
tation of lottery information and obscene or indecent matter (modeled after the
prohibitions in §§ 76.213 and, 76.215, respectively); requiring sponsorship identi-
fication (see § 76.221); specifying an appropriate rate schedule; and permitting
public inspection of a complete record of the names and addresses of all persons or
groups requesting use of equipment or bandwidth. Such a record shall be retained
for a period of two years; (ii) The operating rules required by this section shall be
filed with the Commission within 90 days after a cable system first makes equipment
available and such rules shall be available for public inspection as provided in §
76.305(b). Except on Commission authorization, no local entity shall prescribe
any other rules concerning the use or manner of operation of bandwidth for non-
operator cablecasting.
117 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
118 See text accompanying notes 78-93 supra.
119 47 C.F.R. § 76.253(b)(3) (1975).
120 49 F.C.0.2d at 1108.
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and local regulation continues today. In a recent 1974 Notice of Proposed Rule-
making and Inquiry re Duplicative and Excessive Overregulation of Cable
Television,121 the FG indicated that it was prepared to reconsider its division
of regulatory authority over cable between the federal, state, and local levels.
The reconsideration was based on the report of a Federal-State-Local Advisory
Committee on cable regulation which recommended that the FCC declare that
"it is totally pre-empting regulation of cable and simultaneously announcing its
intention not to occupy certain defined areas of jurisdiction subject to the con-
dition that local [and state] regulation is consistent' 22 with other policies of
the Commission. To do otherwise, the Committee urged, would leave the FCC
with only two alternatives, both of which a majority of the Committee adjudged
unacceptable: (a) total preemption foreclosing legitimate local interests, or
(b) maintenance of the status quo. 2
It is interesting to note that in response to the Committee's report, the Com-
mission still felt the need to ask for comments related to the question of "under
what authority the Commission could adopt rules regulating the type or nature
of non-federal regulatory programs."' 24 At the time of the 1974 Notice of In-
quiry and Proposed Rulemaking, more than 15 years had passed since the
FCC first formally addressed the question of its jurisdiction-its power-over
cable television in Frontier Broadcasting.' But the Chairman of the FCC
himself, in a concurring statement in the 1974 Notice, was forced to admit that
still "the issue of regulatory jurisdiction over cable television is a complex and
difficult subject, fraught with serious legal and constitutional problems."' 28
Nevertheless, in April of 1975, the Commission reasserted jurisdiction over
"pay" cable channels and preempted local regulation of such channels. "Pay"
cable channels are channels for which a per-channel or per-program charge is
made to the subscriber. The Commission based its assertion of jurisdiction over
these channels on the ground that the Midwest Video decision provided ample
justification for the action taken, even though it admitted the infanticide of its
own rule that the Supreme Court had upheld in Midwest Video. 2' Preemption
of local regulation was based on the FCC's belief that the complex nature of
subscription cablecasting, with implications not coincident with state boundaries,
dictated that its regulation emanate from a single source, i.e., the FCC. 28
Section III of this article is designed to suggest a model of cable television
systems which will simplify some of the complexities and difficulties with regard
121 49 F.C.C.2d 1199 (1974).
122 Id. at 1203.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1210. Perhaps it is a mere oversight, but the Commission, as in most of its
dealings with cable television, asks first whether it should adopt the proposals under consider-
ations before it asks whether it can adopt those proposals. See note 21 supra. It is interesting
to note that two weeks before the Commission asked for comments on its authority over non-
federal regulatory positions it was already certain of its position. See Cable Television Report
and Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1078, 1083 (1974), denying reconsideration of the FCC's 1974
Clarification of Cable Television Rules.
125 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
126 49 F.C.C.2d at 1211 (Wiley, Chmn., concurring).
127 First Report and Order re "Pay Cable," - F.C.C.2d - , 40 Fed. Reg. 15546,
15562 (1975).
128 - F.C.C.2d- at - , 40 Fed. Reg. at 11571.
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to the FCC's jurisdiction over nonbroadcast channels of cable systems, leased-
access channels in particular. The purpose is to demonstrate that the answers.
to some of the questions concerning the FCC's jurisdiction over these channels,
can be found in the specific terms of the Communications Act itself.
III. Channels and Cables
Modem communications theory draws on the communications model pro-
posed in the late 1940's by Claude E. Shannon. In this model, the central fea-
ture, connecting the sender and transmitter to the receiver and listener, is the
channel. Most simply stated, a channel of communication is a path over which
information flows.'2"
Some form of this concept is also incorporated into the Communications
Act of 1934, at least in the context of communications common carriage, where
a "line" of communications is defined as
any channel of communication established by the use of the appropriate
equipment.130
Perhaps most importantly, this definition of a channel of communications-like
Shannon's model itself-is not bound to any specific technology. Defining a
channel of communications even as a means of getting a certain quantity of
signals at a certain strength and quality over a certain distance does not tie the
model to any specific technology."' The technical means of communications are
many and varied, including speech, print, braille, radio, optical fibres, laser beams,
and on and on. As broad as the jurisdiction of the FCC is, defining the Com-
mission's jurisdiction in terms of communications by wire and radio actually
leaves out a great deal.
The distinction between the channel of communications and the equip-
ment used to establish it has been emphasized by the FCC:
[W]e believe that the definition of line manifests a primary Congressional
concern over the channel of communication rather than merely the wires
and cables, i.e., the equipment used to establish the channel.132
This functional interpretation of channels of communications, divorced from a
technological substrate, has been upheld in courts with regard to CATV. The
most important case for the development of a functional model is General Tele-
phone Co. of California v. Federal Communications Commission."' That 1969
case in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia involved
communications facilities owned by telephone companies and leased to CATV
operators for the carriage of television signals from the CATV head-end or
antenna to the subscribers' homes. The question in the case was whether the
facilities were subject to the jurisdiction of the FCC. An affirmative answer
129 Telephone interview with Mr. Kelley E. Griffith, Chief, Domestic Rates Division,
Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, July 1973.
130 Communications Act of 1934 § 214(a), 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1970).
131 Interview with Professor Hendrik Bode, Division of Engineering and Applied Physics,
at Harvard University, August 1973.
132 General Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 448, 457, aff'd, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
133 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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meant that before facilities for such use could be constructed, approval of the
FCC under § 214(a) of the Communications Act was required. The telephone
-companies placed strong reliance on the fact that the common carrier lines used
for the transmission of television signals pursuant to contract with CATV oper-
.ators were physically located within the boundaries of one state. Thus, the
-companies argued, the facilities were specifically exempt from FCC jurisdiction
by provision of the Communications Act itself:'
Subject to the provisions of section 301 of this title, nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with re-
spect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities or regulations
for or in connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio
of any carrier .... 35
The court, in an opinion by then Circuit Judge Warren Burger, held that
the FCC did have jurisdiction to require § 214 certification before communica-
tions channels destined for such use are to be constructed:
The Supreme Court [in Southwestern] aptly characterized the functional
aspects of the OATV systems as an "essentially uninterrupted and properly
indivisible" stream of communications. 130
The FCC's jurisdiction was thus upheld based on a functional model focusing
on the use of a particular channel at a given time. The path over which the
information flows starts at the broadcaster's antenna 3 7 and ends in the sub-
scriber's home. Since the complete channel uses a transmission medium over
which the FCC has jurisdiction (the over-the-air travel of electromagnetic
signals), the FCC has jurisdiction over all of the channel, notwithstanding the
fact that the medium through which the signals travel changes from air to wire
someplace midstream.
A corollary of this functional approach is that jurisdiction over communi-
cations channels depends on the use of the channel. Since FCC jurisdiction is
limited to interstate and foreign communications by wire or radio,3 " its jurisdic-
tion is limited to those channels of communication which are used to carry
signals that have either crossed state or country boundaries or have travelled
134 Id. at 397.
135 Communications Act of 1934 § 2(b). 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1970).
136 413 F.2d at 401.
137 Actually, the path used by the information that eventually flows to the television
viewers starts with the creation of the information when the television program is produced.
From there, there are many ways in which the program can be sent to the broadcaster's
antenna to be disseminated over the air. These include sending the program on film or video-
tape to the local broadcast studio where it will be reconverted into electronic signals suitable
for television broadcasting. Or the program could be sent as film or as a stream of electronic
signals to television network headquarters in New York, by mail or by communications
common carrier paths, respectively. From there, the program would again be sent as a
stream of electronic signals from the network headquarters to affiliates over point-to-point
communications paths, owned either by the network itself or leased from the communications
common carriers. And the network affiliates would then do the actual broadcasting. For an
excellent discussion of the factors involved in getting television programming, particularly
the news, to and from the networks' headquarters, see A. EPSTEIN, NEws FROm NOwHERz(1973).
138 Communications Act of 1934 § 2(a), 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
through the air at some time."3 9 Thus, in General Telephone the issue framed
for decision by the Court was
whether the Communications Act vests in the Commission jurisdiction
over channel transmission service and facilities of telephone companies
constructed to carry TV and FM radio signals between a CATV antenna
(or microwave receiver) and the subscribers, when the reception and trans-
mission facilities are entirely within one state and when they are constructed
to provide transmission service to CATV operators carrying signals which
originate from TV and FM broadcasters in another state.140
This principle was further illustrated in a decision by the FCC itself in
1973 in Sterling-Manhattan Cable Television v. New York Telephone." In
that case, New York Telephone (NYT) had constructed telephone lines and
leased them as cable television channels without first obtaining a § 214 certificate
from the FCC. Sterling complained because NYT was leasing its channels to
Trans-World Communications, which was using the channels to show feature
movies on television sets in Sterling's Manhattan franchise area. In holding
that NYT did not require FCC certification, the Commission, citing General
Telephone, noted that "such certification, of course, would be needed before
Telephone Company could lawfully use the subject facilities to transmit broad-
cast television signals for cable system operators.""' 2 The focus is on the use of
the channel, and the clear implication of the case is that if the channels are
not used for interstate signals, they are not subject to FCC regulation. 4
It follows that if one or more cables provide more than one channel, the
system operator may serve more than one function. In other words, merely
because all of the channels are carried over one wire does not mean that they
all have to be used in the same manner. Thus, the FCC's 1972 Cable Rules
require that some channels be used for carriage of signals received "off-the-air"
from broadcast stations; at least three channels to be used (one each) for edu-
cational, local, government and public-access programs; and a number of
channels to be used for leased access on a first-come, first-served basis, even
though all of those channels are provided by the same CATV cable or system.
With the different uses, of course, run differing rights and liabilities. On
the channels carrying broadcast signals, the cable operator is restricted by FCC
rule as to which television signals may be carried.'44 Over the channels in which
the cable operator engages in program origination, the operator is subject to
rules and regulations, such as the "equal time" and "fairness" provisions, much
139 It will be assumed for purposes of this article that the FCC has jurisdiction over
broadcast signals, even if they do not "cross" state or country lines. Cf. Communications
Act of 1934 § 301, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
140 413 F.2d at 396-97 (emphasis added). As discussed in note 139 supra, the possible
requirement that the broadcast signals cross state lines will here be treated as irrelevant.
141 38 F.C.C.2d 1149 (1973).
142 Id. at 1158 n.23 (emphasis added).
143 See also Riverside Cable Corp., 42 F.C.C.2d 783 (1973).
144 47 C.F.R. Pt. 76, Subpt. D (1972). The rules regulating carriage of television
broadcast signals differ depending on such factors as what and how many television signals
are "significantly viewed" in the cable franchise area and in which television market the
cable system is located.
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like those governing conventional broadcasters." 5 Finally, with respect to those
channels to be made available for lease to third parties, access is to be on a first-
come, nondiscriminatory basis, and the cable operator is to have no control over
the content of the programming carried on those channels. 46
The fact that a cable operator may simultaneously maintain different sets
of rights and liabilities with respect to different functions simultaneously served
was illustrated by the United States Supreme Court in 1974 in Teleprompter v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 7 In that case the Court held that CATV
operators were not liable for copyright infringement for carrying television signals
picked up off-the-air and relayed by microwave facilities from distant broadcast
stations. 4 As presented to the Court, the issue was whether the use of micro-
wave links to import signals into remote television markets changed a CATV
system from a "viewing" or "receiving" operation, which incurred no copyright
liability,'49 into a "broadcasting" or "performing" operation which would be
liable for copyright infringement.
CBS, arguing for copyright liability, claimed that three functions performed
by Teleprompter's CATV systems turned them into broadcasters for purposes
of the copyright law. First, CBS argued, when cable operators originate pro-
gramming locally, they "perform" just as broadcasters do. Second, CATV
operators in question sell advertising time to commercial interests desiring to
sell goods or services in the CATV service area, as broadcasters do in their tele-
vision markets. And third, when CATV operators interconnect their systems
so that one program is transmitted over more than one CATV system simul-
taneously, the CATV systems have transformed their functions into those of
broadcasters. By serving these three "broadcasting" functions, the argument
finally concludes, these CATV systems are transformed into broadcasters (per-
formers), thus subjecting them to liability for copyright infringement. 5
The Court, however, rejected this "all or nothing" classification:
The copyright significance of each of these functions-program origination,
sale of commercials, and interconnection-suffers from the same logical
flaw: in none of these operations is there any nexus with the defendant's
reception and rechanneling of the broadcasters' copyrighted materials....
[We hold that . . . the development and implementation of these new
functions, even though they may allow CATV systems to compete more
effectively with the broadcasters for the television market, are simply extra-
neous to a determination of copyright infringement liability with respect to
the reception and retransmission of broadcasters' programs."51
145 47 C.F.R. Pt. 76, Subpt. G (1972). These rules themselves suggest that the FCC
was aware that there would be problems with regard to the operation and control of the
leased-access channels. For if the leased-access channels were working according to plan,
including the provision for expansion of system capacity, there would be no need to regulate
the program origination function of the cable operator himself as if the communications medium
provided by cable television were "scarce."
146 See text accompanying notes 71-93 supra.
147 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
148 It should be noted that this potential liability of the cable operator was one of the
factors that generated complaint about CATV operators to the FCC more than 15 years
earlier in Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 451, 454 (1958).
149 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
150 415 U.S. at 403-04.
151 Id. at 405.
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Although couched in the language of the doctrines of standing 52 the holding is
clear: On some channels, the CATV operator may have copyright problems;
but that does not mean that the same problems carry over to those channels
over which the cable operator serves different functions. 5
The rejection of the proposed "all or nothing" approach is significant because
it indicates the Court's reacceptance of a method of analysis quite distinct from
the jurisdictional argument suggested by the Court in Midwest Video. In Mid-
west Video, it will be recalled, it was the "interdependencies" of CATV systems'
broadcast retransmission and program origination that plainly sufficed to bring
the program origination within the Commission's jurisdiction.'54 The Court in
Midwest Video was thus lumping functions together-the approach explicitly
rejected in Teleprompter. The focus in Telepromter on the different functions
served simultaneously by a single piece of telecommunications equipment is not
a new mode of analysis. As early as 1932, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois
Bell Telephone55 held that, because a telephone plant can be put to both inter-
state and intrastate uses, such plant must be allocated into interstate and intra-
state categories so as to enable independent evaluation of federal and state
regulation.
If the Supreme Court can impute a congressional requirement of indepen-
dent consideration of the liabilities a cable operator incurs with respect to the
independent functions served by different, separate cable channels, then it would
seem reasonable to extend this analysis to those channels over which the cable
operator is not supposed to have any control over content-the leased-access
channels. "Leased-access channels" refers to those channels over which the 1972
Cable Rules' divestiture of CATV operator control is by rule ostensibly com-
plete.'56 Thus not included are the public-access channels, the educational
channels, the local government channels, and any cable operator origination
channel over which the nature of the subject matter (and, in fact, some restric-
tion on content in terms of advertising limitation) is specified in the Cable
Rules. 5
7
There are two central features of the rules with respect to these leased-
access channels. First, the CATV operator is to have no control over the content
152 CBS was denied standing because, although it would complain of an "injury in fact,"
it was unable to assert that the copyright infringements occasioned by the "broadcasting"
performed by CATV operators damaged any "legally protected interests" of CBS. Thus, there
was no "nexus" between the allegedly illegal activity and any of CBS's alleged injuries. It
might be argued, however, that as a matter of constitutional law, the article III "cases and
controversies" requirement is met so long as sufficient injury is alleged. Nevertheless, even
though CBS could allege injury, the activity it complained of injured someone else's legally
protected interests, i.e., those who dealt with CATV operators when those operators were
performing "broadcasting" functions. Because CBS might easily be a competitor of the
program producers whose rights it sought to assert, CBS could not be deemed, to be an
adequate "surrogate" for those copyright proprietors whom it sought to represent.
153 The Court in Teleprompter went on to hold that, over channels which are used to
carry television broadcast signals, even if microwave facilities are employed in that carriage,
CATV operators still function on the "viewer" side of the line, and hence are free of copy-
right liability with regard to the television signals carried.
154 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
155 282 U.S. 133 (1932).
156 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(9) (1975).
157 See 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1975).
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of the communications carried. That aspect is left to the control of the person
leasing the channel. 5 Second, access to these channels is to be provided on a
first-come, nondiscriminatory basis.159
One is immediately struck by the close parallel between the rules governing
leased-access channels and the functional terms used by the FCC to describe a
communications common carrier:
Fundamental to the concept of a communications common carrier is that
such a carrier holds itself out or makes a public offering to provide facilities
by wire or radio whereby all members of the public who choose to employ
such facilities and to compensate the carrier therefor may communicate
or transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing between the points
on the system of that carrier and other carriers connecting with it. In other
words, the carrier provides the means or ways of communication for the
transmission of such intelligence as the subscriber may choose to have
transmitted. The choice of the specific intelligence to be transmitted is,
therefore, the sole responsibility or prerogative of the subscriber, and not
the carrier.160
In fact, while the precise boundaries of the definition of a communications
common carrier are extremely unclear,"' a communications common carrier is
at base described by two features: (1) nondiscriminatory access on a first-come
basis for all who can pay the price, and (2) no control by the carrier over the
content of the communications carried.
Communications common carriers, like broadcasters, are also subject to
the authority of the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to the
Communications Act of 1934. Usually, the Act is thought to deal with tele-
phone and telegraph companies-the traditional, established communications
common carriers. But when the FCC perceives that the functional requirements
are met, new offerings of communications service have been classified as com-
munications common carriers. 62
Classifying leased-access channels of CATV systems as communications
common carrier channels, however, poses grave jurisdictional problems for the
FCC's assertion of regulatory authority over those channels. Specifically, if the
CATV operator can be a broadcaster over some channels, and not a broad-
caster over others, as Teleprompter tells us, there is little to suggest that the
CATV operator cannot be a communications common carrier over some non-
broadcast channels, in particular over leased-access channels.'63 But if the
158 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (9) '(1975).
159 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(11)(iii) (1975).
160 Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 451, 454 (1958) (emphasis added).
161 See generally Berman, Computer or Communications? Allocation of Functions and
the Role of the Federal Communications Commission, 27 FnD. COMMUNICATION B.J. 161, 201-
19 (1974).
162 Memorandum Opinion, Order and Certificate, Application of Packet Communications,
Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 922 (1973). Cf. the suggestion made by Federal Communications Com-
missioner Lee that communications common carrier regulation provide a model for regulating
the proposed Electronic Funds Transfer System. Lee, Communications Regulation and Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Systems, 35 MD. L. REv.-(1975).
163 The proposition, of course, is not free from problems. See discussion Section V infra.
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leased-access channels, serving the function of communications common car-
riage, do not cross any state lines and do not use any radio facilities,"0 4 then it
would seem that the language of the Communications Act itself prevents FCC
regulations of those channels.
Subject to the provisions of section 301 of this Act, nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to apply to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect
to (1) charges, classifications, services, facilities or regulations for or in
connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of any
carrier. .. .. 165
This jurisdictional hurdle itself suggests one possible reason why the "common
carrier" label was dropped almost completely from the language of FCC opin-
ions when leased-access channels were discussed. But the communications com-
mon carriage functions those channels serve have remained in the rules."' The
FCC still asserted jurisdiction over those channels; and, as noted above, 6 " the
Commission did not rely on any plenary grants of power that it might have. 6 '
Rather, an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over leased-access channels
was provided. The next section of this article examines that basis, followed by a
discussion of other problems which are suggested when the functional equiv-
alence between leased-access cable channels and communications common carrier
channels is observed.
IV. FCC Jurisdiction and Leased-Access Channels
Holmes said that jurisdiction is power; and nothing could be more apt to
describe control over communications channels. For this reason, if for none
other, the FCC's assertion of jurisdiction over leased-access channels, in the face
of a statutory provision seeming to indicate that the FCC has no such jurisdic-
tion, deserves very close examination. The FCC's basis for asserting regulatory
control over these channels, quoted above,'69 will be analyzed, assertion by
assertion, and compared against the legal and functional structure for the regu-
lation of communications common carrier channels.
164 These restrictions serve to ensure that the channels are not interstate channels of
communications. See notes 138-40 & accompanying text.
165 Communications Act of 1934 § 2(b), 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1970). Section 301 of the
Act deals with the licensing and uses of the radio spectrum and radio transmitters.
166 See note 61 supra.
167 See text accompanying note 53 supra.
168 Furthermore, given the history of the Communications Act itself, an assertion of
plenary power would be subject to serious challenge in any event. The two major operational
parts of the Communications Act of 1934 correspond to earlier legislation providing for the
regulation of communications common carriers and radio broadcasters by separate bodies.
Since 1910, regulations of communications common carriers had been vested in the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. Federal regulation of radio broadcasting had been authori-
tatively vested in the Federal Radio Commission in 1927. As part of New Deal reorganiza-
tions, regulation of communications common carriers was incorporated into Title II of the
1934 Act. Provisions parallelling the Radio Commission's powers were incorporated into
Title III. Thus, grants of power made to the FCC are not made under Title I, which might
be the source of any plenary power, with its broadly phrased "purpose' and ?applicability"
sections, but under Titles II and III. See New Rules Analysis, supra note 53, at 1167.
169 See text accompanying note 97 supra.
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A. The Argument That Nonbroadcast and Broadcast Channels Are
"Integrally Bound Up"
In asserting jurisdiction over leased-access channels, the FCC began:
We turn now to the question of regulation of access channels presenting
nonbroadcast programming. We believe that such regulation is properly
the concern of this Commission. These channels fulfill Communications Act
purposes and are integrally bound up with the broadcast signals being car-
ried by the cable .... 170
That leased-access channels fulfill Communications Act purposes is no rea-
son, in and of itself, for asserting FCC jurisdiction over them. There are a good
number of government programs or private enterprises that fulfill Communi-
cations Act purposes but are not subject to the jurisdiction of the FCC. For
example, the low interest loans provided by the Department of Agriculture's
Rural Electrification Administration and by the Rural Telephone Bank for the
extension of telephone service to remote, rural areas are designed to provide
universal telephone service,' a goal incorporated into the mandate of the FCC:
to make available . . . to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide and worldwide communication service, with ade-
quate facilities at reasonable charges .... 172
In fact, the loan program was established because the FCC had been unsuccess-
ful in getting the telephone companies to extend their lines to such rural areas.7
This is not surprising, given that extension of telephone lines is essentially a local
affair and that the FCC's jurisdiction deals with interstate and foreign commu-
nications.
Also, the fact that "[access] channels... are integrally bound up with the
broadcast signals being carried by the cable" does not provide a basis for assert-
ing jurisdiction. First, the FCC's technological rules regarding cable system
operation require that each of a system's channels be free from interference
from any of the others. 74 It is also clear that the channels are to be used for
separate functions, serving separate purposes as well. Lumping such functions
and purposes together under the "integrally bound up" rubric does violence to
the method of analysis used by the Supreme Court in Teleprompter, which
treated separate functions separately' 7 5
Even more compelling is the observation that if access channels are bound
up with broadcast channels, so are intrastate communications common carrier
channels integrally bound up with interstate communications common carrier
170 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 193 (1972).
171 Rural Telephone Assistance Act, ch. 351, 63 Stat. 948 (1949), amending 7 U.S.C. §
923 (1946); Rural Telephone Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 92-12, 85 Stat. 30 (1971), amending 7
U.S.C. § 942 (1970).
172 Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
173 See H.R. REP. No. 246, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
174 47 C.F.R. Pt. 76, Subpt. K-Technical Standards (1975).
175 See text accompanying notes 152-57 supra.
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channels. For example, an intrastate telephone call (one originating and termi-
nating in the same state) and an interstate call might be carried over the same
wire, but of course on separate channels. 76 This fact does not grant the FCC
jurisdiction over the intrastate use of the telephone channel. 7 Nor should it, by
the same analogy, grant jurisdiction to the FCC over the leased-access channels
of a cable system merely because some of the other channels on the system carry
broadcast signals or are otherwise subject to the FCC's power. 7 The channels
do not cross state lines and are not established by radio technology.'79
B. The Argument that the Consumer Will Not be Able to Distinguish
Between Access and Broadcast Programs
The FCC continued:
It is by no means clear that the viewing public will be able to distinguish
between a broadcast program and an access program; rather the subscriber
will simply turn the dial from broadcast to access programming, much as
he now selects television fare.8 0
Again, analogy to traditional common carrier channels-those provided
by the telephone companies-is in order. This "subscriber confusion" argu-
ment simply proves too much. It would imply that the FCC should have, and
does have, regulatory jurisdiction over all telephone calls, both interstate and
intrastate, merely because when a telephone rings or even when a phone is
picked up, a telephone subscriber cannot tell whether the call is an interstate
one or an intrastate one. Clearly, FCC jurisdiction over intrastate communica-
tions common carriers does not extend so far; thus, it should not extend to the
intrastate communications common carriage performed by cable systems. 8'
176 This is true in two respects. First, the same wire might be part of two different
channels at two different times, one channel intrastate, and another interstate. Second, if
more than one call is carried over the same telephone wire, as with "trunk" lines, then
each call might be using an interstate or intrastate channel. The fact that all of the calls are
using channels provided by the same technological substrate during a particular portion of
the path from sender to receiver of each particular call is of no significance.
177 Admittedly notwithstanding the seemingly flat bar against federal regulation of intra-
state communications common carrier channels, the FCC might exercise some authority over
the technical standards of intrastate channels indirectly so as to insure that, when the channels
are used for interstate communications, the federal technical requirements will be met. See
text accompanying notes 214-16 infra.
178 Analogy to the telephone network provides at least part of the argument for the Na-
tional Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, which is appealing the FCC's con-
tinued assertion of jurisdiction over leased-access channels, regardless of the use to which the
channels are put. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.
FCC, Civil No. 75-1075 (D.C. Cir., filed June 20, 1975). Although the Association is
challenging only the FCC's assertion of jurisdiction with regard to nonvideo uses of leased-
access channels, the arguments that two-way, point-to-point, nonvideo communications services
for hire via cable are not encompassed within the FCC's "ancillary to broadcasting" jurisdic-
tion and are carrier services subject to state regulation would have obvious applicability to
leased-access channels carrying video services as well. Cf. Sterling-Manhattan Cable Television
v. New York Tel., 38 F.C.C.2d 1149 (1973).
179 These restrictions serve to ensure that the channels are not interstate channels of
communications. See notes 138-40 & accompanying text supra.
180 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 193 (1972).
181 It should also be noted that the entire "consumer confusion" argument could be under-
cut quite simply by requiring that users of leased access channels identify the channel period-
ically as an access channel.
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C. The Argument That Intrastate Channels Are Potential Interstate Channels
Further, the FCC's jurisdictional argument proceeds:
Moreover, leased channels will undoubtedly carry interconnected program-
ming via satellite or interstate terrestrial facilities, matters that are clearly
within the Commission's jurisdiction.1 12
Again, this argument proves too much. For if it is applied to all commu-
nications common carriage, not only that performed by cable systems, all tele-
phone calls would be regulated by the FCC. With regard to traditional com-
munications common carriers, it is the use of the channel that determines who
regulates. This was stated by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois Bell Tele-
phone"2 as early as 1932. Thus, if the telephone line from home to the tele-
phone office is used for an intrastate call, there is no federal regulation; if the
line is used for an interstate call, then there is federal regulation, without any
change in the physical facilities used to get the call from the local phone office
to the home. And if a home or business has more than one telephone number
assigned to it, it is perfectly possible that one "line" might be subject to federal
regulation at the same time that another is not, even though the "lines" are pro-
,4ded by only one wire or cable. Thus, the "capability" argument used by the
FCC denies the analytical basis on which the FCC's jurisdiction over communi-
cations common carrier channels leased to CATV operators for the carriage of
television signals was upheld in General Telephone:8 It is the use of the chan-
nel that is determinative. But it is not argued that the FCC should not have
jurisdiction when an interstate or foreign use is made of leased-access channels.
Even though the Supreme Court in Midwest Video noted the "capability"
argument as a possible support for FCC jurisdiction, the FCC itself seems to
have questioned this basis for asserting jurisdiction over communications chan-
nels in Sterling-Manhattan Cable Television v. New York Telephone."5 Sterling
had asked that the FCC assert jurisdiction over the NYT channels being used
to carry movies to hotel rooms because of "the language in the Midwest Video
case to the effect that the capacity for interstate non-broadcast programming
may, in itself suffice to bring cablecasts within [the FCC's] jurisdiction as inter-
state communication." '  The Commission in Sterling-Manhattan, however,
noted that the Supreme Court did not decide the question.'
D. The Argument That the FCC Has Jurisdiction Over Access Channels
Because It Has Jurisdiction Over Other Nonbroadcast Channels
In continuing its jurisdiction justification, the FCC states:
182 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 193 (1972).
183 282 U.S. 133 (1932).
184 See text accompanying notes 132-35 supra.
185 38 F.C.C.2d 1149 (1973).
186 Id. at 1158.
187 The "capability" argument would also run counter to the language of § 2(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934, quoted in text accompanying note 135 supra.
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Finally, it is this Commission that must make the decisions as to what con-
ditions to be imposed on the operations of pay cable channels, and we have
already taken steps in that direction. (See § 76.225) 1"8
The strongest argument to support FCC jurisdiction over pay cable, origi-
nation or access cablecasting operations for which a per-program or per-channel
charge to subscribers is made, is based directly on the "ancillary to broadcasting"
basis for upholding FCC jurisdiction over CATV in Southwestern. The basic
assumption is that promoters and producers of "television" type programming,
such as movies, prize fights, and the World Series, may find pay cable arrange-
ments more lucrative than normal commercial broadcasting outlets. Thus, in
order to protect the broadcasting industry from loss of important programming
sources, the argument would go, the FCC must regulate pay cable. Protecting
broadcasting in this manner would clearly be "ancillary" to the regulation of
broadcasting.
The statement quoted above to the effect that FCC regulation of pay cable
channels is imperative, however, is located in that paragraph of the 1972 Cable
Television Report and Order in which the Commission is providing jurisdictional
justification for its regulation of leased-access channels. The clear inference is
that the Commission based its assertion of authority over leased-access channels
(where no per-program or per-channel charge is made) on its authority to regu-
late pay cable channels."8 9 In other words, when reduced to the language of
Southwestern, the Commission is regulating leased-access channels because they
are ancillary to the Commission's regulation of pay cable, which is ancillary to
the Commission's regulation of broadcasting. Such a leap stretches the holding
of Southwestern along with the jurisdiction of the Commission to a considerable
degree.
Another basis for FCC jurisdiction over pay or subscription cablecasting
was argued in April 1975, in the First Report and Order re "Pay Cable."'
The Commission held that the Supreme Court's decision in Midwest Video
provided ample justification for jurisdiction over cable channels for which a per-
channel or per-program charge is made.' The assertion of jurisdiction, while
noting that the rule in question in Midwest Video is now defunct, fails to address
at least two issues. First, the Midwest Video analysis might be questioned in the
light of the Supreme Court's independent functional analysis of independently
188 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 193 (1972).
189 The focus here is on access channels, not on origination channels which are presently
subject to FCC regulation pursuant to the Midwest Video case. It should be noted, however,
that the regulation governing "pay" cable may be subject to attack on other grounds. The
"pay" cable rule deals in large measure with restrictions as to when feature movies may be
carried over certain cable systems. While framed as a restriction on the operation of cable
television operators, the rule obviously also restricts the universe of outlets to which a feature
movie copyright proprietor may sell or rent his product. Such restrictions are not unlike
those found to be in excess of the Commission's jurisdiction in GTE Service Corp. v.
FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973). In that case, restrictions on the freedom of purchase
of communications services by data processing subsidiaries of common carriers which, by FCC
rule, were separate entities from the common carrier parent were held invalid as imposing
a restriction on those subsidiaries which were not faced by other independent data processors.
190 - F.C.C.2d - , 40 Fed. Reg. 15546 (1975), reconsideration denied, - F.C.C.
2d -, 40 Fed. Reg. 34341 (1975).
191 - F.C.C.2d at -, 40 Fed. Reg. at 15562.
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served functions in Teleprompter. Second, the Midwest Video affirmance of
jurisdiction was in fact based on the Court's perception as to the merits of the
rule in question. Now that the Commission has decided that mandatory oper-
ator origination is not the most effective means to foster local expression,19 so
too might the Court decide that upholding Commission assertions of jurisdiction
in the area of cable television regulation is not the most effective means of serv-
ing first amendment interests or encouraging congressional policy-making in
the area.
The Commission's assertion of jurisdiction over pay cable channels, of
course, does not speculate on the effect the Commission's repeal of the program
origination rule may have on the Justices' attitudes toward other Commission
claims of extended jurisdiction. In fact, had the Court known in advance that
the Commission would quickly repeal the rule, the Court might well have dis-
missed the case as moot, refusing to spend precious Court time on what has now
become an academic exercise. One suspects that, as a practical matter, in any
future court challenge to Commission rules in the area, the Commission's rapid
repeal of the program origination rule will draw attention as an indicator of
the Commission's own uncertainty as to the effects of its rules with regard to
cable television nonbroadcast channels. The result could easily be a reduction
in judicial credence of Commission findings and beliefs about what the Com-
mission says it is doing and what purposes it purportedly is serving.'93
E. The Argument That Regulation Is Needed
The jurisdictional argument in conclusion proclaims:
Federal regulation is thus clearly called for.194
This statement by the FCC, more than any other made with respect to
FCC jurisdiction over leased-access channels, might be true. But so too might
it be true that federal regulation of some aspects of intrastate telephone service
might be called for. 95 There is a long way, at least in the theory of congressional
delegation of power, between perceiving that regulation is called for and actually
having the power to provide the called-for regulation. The critical issue here is
who decides when a new industry or a new service offering is to be regulated:
Congress or the administrative agency?
V. Leased-Access Channels as Common Carrier Channels: Benefits
Costs and Problems
On analysis, the most interesting ramifications of treating cable leased-access
192 See text accompanying note 111 supra.
193 This speculation may not be idle for very long. The Commission's "pay" cable rules
are currently being appealed in a case filed recently in the United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, Civil No. 75-1280 (D.C. Cir.,
filed Aug. 12, 1975).
194 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 193 (1972).
195 See Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974), discussed at note 213 infra.
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channels as communications common carrier channels were not raised by the
Commission when it asserted jurisdiction over those channels. These issues in-
clude the allocation of CATV plant between interstate and intrastate uses for
ratemaking purposes and the suggestion of a requirement of universal CATV
service. Most importantly, however, deciding that leased-access channels are
indeed communications common carrier channels would facilitate the goals
espoused by the Commission in requiring the channels to be available.196 First,
the notion that a communications common carrier is to have no control over
the contents of the communications carried is well-established. And second, as
a corollary of this lack of control, communications common carriers are pro-
tected from liability for libel or slander with regard to the communications car-
ried.'97 Thus, notwithstanding the jurisdictional difficulties, a declaration by
the Commission that these are communications common carrier services would
both alleviate cable operator concern about libel liability and relieve channel
lessee restraint due to any control that the cable operator might retain.9
Moreover, it is not at all clear that state or local regulation of some aspects
of CATV operation would be detrimental or harmful. It is intuitively clear
that the Iowa farmer and the Manhattan highrise dweller have different infor-
mation needs. Yet it is precisely such differences in needs and attitudes that
make local solutions preferable to a national solution to some cable television
issues and problems. From the federal viewpoint, more than one level of regu-
lation of leased-access channels may seem confusing or duplicative. But this
conclusion might well be dictated by the tenets of uniformity and evenhanded-
ness fundamental to federal regulation, the same basic principles which pre-
clude the federal regulation that accommodates diversity between states by dis-
criminating among them. Yet, it has been observed: "There are obvious
values-in terms of simplicity, the understandability of the law, and even in
certainty-in a dual system of government under which many problems are
196 See Gerlach, supra note 70; Note, Common Carrier CATV: Problems and Proposals,
37 BROOxLYN L. REv. 533 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Common Carrier CATV]; Note,
Regulation of Community Antenna Television, 70 COLIUM. L. Rev. 837 (1970); Rules Evalu-
ation, supra note 62; Community Ownership, supra note 84.
197 No case has been discovered which even entertains the notion that a telephone com-
pany would be liable for libel for the content of the communications carried over telephone
channels. With regard to telegraph companies, however, the control the telegrapher has in
transcribing the message from voice or record into code and back has limited the telegraph
companies' privilege from libel liability to a qualified privilege. As a general rule, a telegraph
company is free from libel liability for the communications carried if the message is trans-
mitted in the regular course of the business and if the company and its agents are free of
ill will and malice. O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1949);
Parker v. Edwards, 222 N.C. 75, 21 S.E.2d 876 (1942); 74 Am. JuR. 2d Telecommunications
§ 77 (1974); W. PROSSER, LAW oF ToRTs § 793 (4th ed. 1971). Even though, as Prosser
indicates, "the better view is that it is privileged to publish matter obviously defamatory,
unless there is reason to believe the sender is not privileged," some older cases have indicated
that the qualified privilege enjoyed by telegraph companies is limited to those situations in
which the message is ambiguous or the operator reasonably believes the sender to be privileged.
E.g., Paton v. Great Northwestern Tel. Co., 141 Minn. 430, 170 N.W. 511 (1919). See also
Nye v. Western Union Tel. Co., 104 F. 628 (7th Cir. 1900).
198 Even though it has taken the Commission more that 15 years to find a final answer
to the CATV jurisdictional problem, it only took the Commission 11 months to decide to
regulate, as communications common carriers, new service offerings combining both computer
and communications technologies and functions. See generally Berman, supra note 5.
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handled finally at the local level without the necessity for resort to a central
authority.3
1 99
But a model which allocates regulatory authority over CATV leased-access
channels to state and local bodies.. because the channels are used to provide
intrastate communications common carriage raises several questions as well.
First, one might question whether a cable operator is allowed to engage in both
program origination and communications common carriage at the same time,
in light of the arguable prohibition of such a combination of functions in §
3 (h) of the Communications Act: "[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting
shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common car-
rier.... .2" There are, however, several reasons why this provision would not
apply to CATV operators. At the outset, it is clear that a cable television oper-
ator is not engaged in radio broadcasting. But even if that observation is not
sufficient to avoid application of the statutory proscription, it is also clear that
the history of radio broadcasting is sufficient. In the early 1920's, the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company decided to try to enter the field of radio
broadcasting according to a scheme modelled substantially on the operation of
the telephone network. The telephone company would own the radio stations,
which would be connected with long-distance telephone lines, and responsible
community groups would use the stations and the network to address the nation.
The company would only require that the groups pay it enough to cover the
expenses of operating the stations and to provide a reasonable rate of return on
the company's investment. This plan was thwarted later in the 1920's by both
independent broadcasters and an antitrust consent agreement which saw the
withdrawal of AT&T from commercial broadcasting and the birth of the Na-
tional Broadcasting Company." 2 Section 3(h) of the Communications Act of
1934 is a vestige of that consent agreement designed to ensure that broadcasting
would not be subject to any of the traditional restrictions imposed on common
carriers, such as first-come, nondiscriminatory access and, more importantly,
limits on profit levels. The provision was not designed to prevent a common
carrier from engaging in broadcasting0 . and, indeed, such a combination of
functions was suggested by the FCC with regard to cable television in 1972:
For now, we remain of the view that the most appropriate mix for the
orderly development of cable and for encouraging the maximization of its
potential for the public benefit is one that embraces ".... a multi-purpose
CATV operation combining carriage of broadcast signals with program
origination and common carrier services. .. ." (First Report and Order in
199 A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 1039 (1965).
200 The absence of regulation on the state level need not be determinative of federal juris-
diction. In Texas, for example, local telephone service is not regulated on the state level.
Rather, such regulation is allocated to local bodies.
201 Communications Act of 1934 § 3(h), 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970).
202 C. BORCHARDT, STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. COMMUNICATIONS IN-
DUSTRY 60-61 (1970).
203 Telephone interview with Henry Geller, former General Counsel, Federal Communi-
cations Commission, September 1975.
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Docket 18397 . . .) The rules adopted [with respect to access and use of
nonbroadcast channels] are designed to accomplish that.20 4
Another suggested problem concerns the service coverage a cable operator
would be required to provide if the system were regarded as providing commu-
nications common carriage. Specifically, it has been argued that as a communi-
cations common carrier, a CATV system would be required to establish universal
service, that is, service to every home within the system's service area. 20 5 But
this observation mistakes for an essential requirement of communications com-
mon carriage a policy that is incbrporated into the language of the Communi-
cations Act:
to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States,
a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide communication service, with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges. .... 206
Thus, telephone companies in Mississippi are considered communications com-
mon carriers, even though as of December 31, 1972, only 76 percent of Missis-
sippi households had telephone service.
211
The distinction is between the legal requirement that a communications
common carrier merely allow his facilities to be used by anyone choosing to do
so and the statutory policy that communications service be extended actively to
all. For example, the FCC recently classified as communications common car-
riage a new service offering designed to create a communications network for
computer data transmission, even though the service would only be extended
to those cities where demand was high enough to support the service. 28 Further-
more, as noted above," 9 by 1950 the FCC had not been successful in implement-
ing the policy that telephone service be extended universally to remote rural
areas. The task of subsidizing these rural operations was therefore delegated
to the Rural Electrification Administration and later to the Rural Telephone
204 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 197 (1972). Furthermore,
the FCC has approved as communications common carriage an offering of service by the
common carriers called Multipoint Distribution Service. This service uses more or less omnm-
directional microwave signals to serve the identical function that CATV systems serve with
leased-access channels established by wire distribution facilities. But rather than requiring
the MDS operator to set aside channels or time for specific purposes or to originate programs,
the MDS operator's responsibility, like that of any communication common carrier "is
to provide services necessary to, and ancillary to, the provision of the communication service
offered, without affecting or influencing the content of the information communicated. Put
more simply, the carrier's responsibility is to provide 'a pipeline' pursuant to his tariff for
the transmission of customer provided information between two or more points as specified
by the customer." 39 Fed. Reg. 2761 (1974). The multipoint nature of the technological
configuration employed, however, would appear to place the common carrier offering MDS in
a position very close to the configuration desired by AT&T when it attempted to go into the
broadcasting business: the carrier provides the means for radio dissemination of the signals
from one point to many, and the user provides the information or the programming.
205 Note, Cable Television: A Regulatory Dilemma, 13 B.C. IN". & CoM. L. REv. 326,
358 (1971).
206 Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
207 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 501 (1974).
208 Memorandum Opinion, Order and Certificate, Application of Packet Communications,
Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 922 (1973).
209 See text accompanying note 171 supra.
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Bank, which operate under the auspices and the participation of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, not the FCC.2"'
A similar point can be made with respect to the proposition that com-
munications common carriage necessarily implies the provision of a switched,
point-to-point communications service. To be sure, such attributes are commonly
found when considering traditional common carriers such as telephone and
telegraph companies. But neither point-to-point service nor switching is an
essential requirement of communications common carriage. Western Union, for
example, offers a common carrier service called Mailgram which uses terminals
installed in post offices to enable the user to send the same message to many
places simultaneously, in effect establishing a point-to-multipoint service. Simi-
larly, switching of communications channels is introduced into communications
networks because it is unrealistic in almost every case for each user to have an
independent, private, and separate line connecting him with every other user.
Instead, in the telephone network, for example, a hierarchical network design
using trunk lines and switching centers is employed to reduce the number of
lines and to increase system flexibility and security. 1
The jurisdictional division occasioned by treating leased-access channels
as communications common carrier channels does, at least at first glance, raises
a difficulty with regard to separating the intrastate and interstate uses of the
channels provided by a single cable system for rate-making purposes. Even
though there are different uses of CATV channels, interstate and intrastate
services will use some physical plant jointly, such as the cable itself. Further-
more, when a leased-access channel normally serving intrastate functions is inter-
connected in such a manner as to activate federal regulation, the same physical
facility will have been subject to two different regulatory schemes, again making
cost and price allocations difficult.
It must be recalled, however, that procedures for separating costs to be
allocated to interstate and intrastate uses of the same physical plant have long
been used in setting telephone rates. No doubt, the procedure has changed over
the years, as have the resulting cost allocations;21. but the presently employed
separations process and mechanism are incorporated into the FCC's own rules."'&
This is not to suggest that the process is a simple one or that it is devoid of
political considerations. Rather, the point is here made that the problem is not
insurmountable and may even be mandated by the fact that although the na-
tional communications network is a unified system, the federal governmental
system incorporates two levels of government. In fact, it has been suggested
that the pricing of CATV services is detailed enough to require the kind of super-
vision which a local or state agency is competent to undertake and which a
national body, such as the FCC, cannot responsively provide.1 4
210 See note 171 supra.
211 See, e.g., Inose, Communication Networks, 227 SCIENTIFIC AM. No. 3, Sept. 1972, at
117.
212 See generally D. GABEL, DEVELOPMENT OF SEPARATIONS PRINCIPLES IN THE TELE-
PHONE INDUSTRY (1965).
213 47 C.F.R. § 67.1 (1971), incorporating by reference, NARUc-FCC COOPETIVE COMM.
ON COMMUNICATIONS, SEPARATIONS MANUA (1972).
214 Common Carrier CATV, supra note 196, at 546-47.
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A more meaningful problem with respect to federal-state relations in the
context of cable television regulation may arise with respect to the technological
specifications of cable channels. Because cable channels can be used to serve
interstate or intrastate functions, it may be argued that the interstate, federally
regulated uses must be assured that channels meeting federal standards will be
available. Thus, in the telephony context, it has been observed that the demands
of federally regulated, long-distance services have prompted the introduction of
techniques designed to improve local channel quality.215 But in the telephony
context, the answer to the question of how far a state may regulate in a
manner inconsistent with federal technical requirements is still unsettled. 16 It
seems clear, however, that if a state or local authority were to provide for
technical standards that meet (or even exceed) the channel quality requirements
established by the FCC for interstate or broadcast uses of CATV channels, then
there would be no problem of state imposition of undue burdens on interstate
commerce.
2 17
The most difficult and important obstacles to the acceptance of a model
suggesting that federal regulation of some CATV channels is precluded are
presented by the decision in the Midwest Video case.2"' That case was decided
after the promulgation of the 1972 Cable Rules, which provided for federal
jurisdiction and preemption of leased-access channel regulation. It is clear that
the plurality opinion contemplates the provision of cablecasting by the cable
operator as a condition precedent to the carriage of television signals over the
cable system. Thus, a strong case can be made that the FCC could condition the
carriage of television signals on the cable operator's provision of leased-access
channels. But whether or not the FCC can proceed one step further, asserting
regulatory jurisdiction over these leased-access channels and other "local in-
cidents" of cable television, precluding local regulation of such incidents, is
a much more difficult position to sustain. For in so asserting jurisdiction and so
preempting state and local regulation of leased-access channels, the Commission
has had to overlook, ignore, or refuse to recognize that such channels are used
215 See GABEL, supra note 212, at 33-34.
216 It seems fairly clear that a federal court would defer to an administrative agency's
requirements as to technical specifications of communications channels used for both inter-
:state and intrastate purposes, although "administrative regulations" do not fit the precise lan-
guage of the supremacy clause of the Constitution and although the Communications Act
makes specific exemption for intrastate channels from federal regulation. The issue is on
appeal from an FCC decision in Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204, on appeal sub
nor. North Carolina Public Util. Comn'n v. United States, Civil No. 74-1220 (4th Cir., filed
Feb. 27, 1974). In that case, the North Carolina Public Utilities Commission found that
interconnection of nontelephone company equipment with the 'telephone network would
cause significant damage to the intrastate telephone network. The PUC therefore prohibited
such interconnection with regard to intrastate use of the network. The effect of the state
decision would be to bar interconnection on all calls. In order to implement the Carterfone
decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), which allowed for nontelephone company interconnection
on interstate calls, the FCC in Telerent said that it had prempted the interconnect field
and was requiring all carriers and connecting carriers subject to FCC jurisdiction at all to file
interconnection tariffs with the FCC. Carterfone was based on a finding that there would
not be significant damage to the telephone system if, subject to technical standards, non-
telephone company equipment were interconnected with the telephone network. The issue
of whether or not the FCC can so preempt is being appealed.
217 The easiest path for any local or state authority would be to incorporate the federal
technical requirements by reference, thus ensuring that conflicts are kept to the bare minimum.
218 See text accompanying notes 62-70 supra.
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as communications common carrier channels and, as such, are exempt from
federal regulation under the terms of the Communications Act itself.
Further, in upholding the FCC's mandatory origination rules, the plurality in
Midwest Video relied heavily on the fact that the local origination rules served
the important policies of encouraging diversity and robust debate incorporated
into the Communications Act. There can be no question, however, that
classifying leased-access channels as common carrier channels and employing
the existing legal structure to ensure nondiscriminatory access and to restrict to
a minimum any cable operator control over the content of the communications
would also serve the same purposes of the Communications Act and, indeed, the
first amendment.
The critical question thus becomes: Who decides how these policy intersts
are to be served? If the regulatory model for communications common carriage
is employed, then the congressional answer to that question is clear, and federal
regulation of leased-access channels would be precluded. But if the functional
analysis which would treat leased-access channels as communications common
carrier channels is ignored, then no congressional intent is readily apparent
because Congress simply has been unable, for whatever reason, to "speak" with
regard to cable television regulation. Thus, by maintaining an analytical separa-
tion between cable television, in all its aspects, and common carriage, the FCC
has been able to argue that in the absence of any apparent congressional intent,
the Commission ought to be given a wide degree of latitude in deciding how
Communications Act and first amendment policies are to be served.
No statutorily prescribed scheme [for CATV] has been imposed, nor does
our action run counter to any expressed legislative purpose.219
Of course, it goes without saying that with no statutorily prescribed scheme
imposed, there could be no expressed legislative purpose to which a Commission
action could run counter. But by making such a statement, the FCC has given
clear indication that until Congress acts, the Commission will proceed to regulate
cable television as it sees fit. Admittedly, the mandate of the FCC is broad, but
does that breadth include filling political voids left by Congress?
219 Teleprompter Cable Systems Inc., 33 P. & F. Radio Reg. 2d 1141, 1151 (1975) (dTeny-
ing local certificate of compliance to Teleprompter's Johnstown, Pennsylvania, cable system).
For support for the proposition that the action of denying a local certificate of compliance did
not run counter to any expressed legislative purpose, as no statutorily prescribed scheme for
CATV had been imposed, the Commission cited General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 405
(D.C. Cir. 1969) and American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 487 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1973). The
latter case involved an FCC requirement that carriers seek "special permission" for rate in-
creases in addition to the tariff-filing procedures specified by the Communications Act. In
holding that the Commission's requirement circumvented the statutory plan for carrier-initiated
rate increases, the court distinguished the statutory treatment of communications common
carriers and cable television operators:
Since procedures and limitations for ancillary regulation of the CATV industry had
not been provided for in the statute, the issue before the Court in [United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968)] was significantly different from that
in the instant case. In upholding the Commission's order in Southwestern, the
court did not condone circumvention of statutorily prescribed procedures with con-
sequent frustration of statutory purpose.
487 F.2d at 975, quoted at 52 F.C.C.2d at -
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VI. Conclusion
Whether or not the Federal Communications Commission has jurisdiction
under the terms of the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate some or all
aspects of CATV is a question demanding much more than an academic exer-
cise in the application of an old statute to a new technology. The issue is both
critical and political: Who-Congress, courts or Commission-decides who--
marketplace, Congress, courts, federal commissions, state agencies, local bodies,
private entrepreneurs-decides how information services are to be made avail-
able, to whom, and for how much.
Such decisions are political ones, not only because they contribute to the
larger social allocation and distribution of resources, but also because they obvi-
ously affect how and what information is received by citizens in our society.
Important first amendment interests are therefore involved. This is particularly
true with respect to those channels of CATV systems which could be made avail-
able on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis, and which could be free from any
control by the owner of the system as to the content of the information carried.
To at least some observers, it is the availability of these leased-access CATV
channels that presents a viable potential for aiding substantially in relieving what
has been seen as a crisis caused by growing demands by numerous groups for
access to "the media."
The FCC has conditioned the carriage of television broadcast signals by
CATV systems on the provision of program origination equipment and the
availability of access channels of various kinds. Thus, as a purely logical matter,
the FCC could also condition the carriage of television broadcast signals on a
rule that the cable system operator engage in no services which might be classified
as communications common carriage. If such a condition were imposed, then the
suggestion that the FCC does not have jurisdiction over leased-access channels
would be eliminated by hypothesis. Such elimination of jurisdictional un-
certainty would, of course, represent a flagrant sacrifice of important policy ob-
jectives, announced and articulated by the FCC itself, in order to insulate FCC
jurisdiction from attack.
But the FCC seems to have attempted to do precisely that, albeit less
flagrantly, with regard to the leased-access channels of cable systems as described
in the FCC's own rules. The Commission has avoided any language that in-
dicates that these channels are used as a communications common carrier would
use them. In so doing, the FCC has at least obfuscated the question of whether
leased-access CATV channels might be excluded from FCC jurisdiction under the
terms of the Communications Act itself because they are channels used for intra-
state communications common carriage. Avoiding the communications com-
mon carrier model also means that the FCC is unable to provide the cable
operator with complete assurance that he will not incur liability for such wrongs
as libel for the carriage of communications over which the cable operator is sup-
posed to have no control as to content. Thus, the cable operator must maintain
some control, and his interests begin to diverge from the interests of those who
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would desire to use those leased-access channels free of any involvment by the
private system operator.
While designed to serve the policy of encouraging program diversity, the
FCC rule allowing the cable operator to engage in program origination if
he so desires also has unfortunate side effects. Users of leased-access channels
may be viewed by the operator as competitors to be discouraged, not as par-
ticipants in a process for the provision of information from diverse and antago-
nistic sources to a wide audience. If there were ever any fears that cable operators,
as controllers of a source of many communications channels, would have undue
power, these fears have manifested themselves in the restrictions imposed on the
programming provided by the cable operator himself, restrictions closely parallel-
ing those of television broadcast programming made necessary by the scarcity
of that medium. But these fears and those restrictions can be discarded if, with
respect to, nonbroadcast channels, the cable operator is viewed merely as the
provider of a communications facility, and nothing more.
Relying on a communications common carrier model would prohibit the
cable operator from exercising any control over the content of the communica-
tions carried; it would require that the facilities be available, like the telephone
system, on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis; and it would require
that the communications facilities be available at reasonable, yet compensatory,
prices.22 But most importantly, relying on the communications common carrier
model would place the cable operator in a position to support the use of leased-
access channels and to encourage the establishment of new sources of information
and information services in our society.
Control over information and information services in our society is indeed
a great source of power. The existence of the Federal Communications Com-
mission is testimony to congressional realization of that fact. The Communica-
tions Act of 1934 which created that Commission speaks directly to the regula-
tion of communications common carriers and radio broadcasters. In contrast,
the application of that 40-year-old Act to cable television has been marked by
Commission vacillation and self-reversal, both with respect to its own jurisdiction
and its own substantive rules. There is no legislative history to aid the Commis-
sion in the regulation of cable television. There are no true standards or specific
procedures to guide the Commission in its application of its self-assumed, broad
delegation of power over cable television. The need for congressional action is
apparent and, with regard to cable television regulation, such action is long
overdue.
The jurisdictional division between interstate and intrastate uses of our uni-
fied telecommunications network, however, suggests broader congressional
action might be warranted. In the over 40 years since the Communications Act
was enacted, there has been a significant shift in the Constitutional interpretation
of the power of the federal government under the commerce clause of article I,
220 There would be no need for "rate-base" motivation of rates so long as the rates specified
meet two criteria. First, the requirements of communications common carriage demand that the
rates be reasonable to the user. Second, the requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution demand that the rates provide reasonable compen-
sation to the owner of the property dedicated to the public service.
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§ 8. In this light, the FCC's increase in power, whether self-delegated or
not, serves to signal the need for a fresh new approach toward the development
of a national communications policy--the kind of broad, sweeping reappraisal
that only Congress, together with the President, can perform.
To the FCC, the cable operators, the copyright owners, the television broad-
casters, the Office of Telecommunications Policy, the telephone companies-to
all the actors with some element of input and control over cable television
systems in particular, and communications systems in general, congressional action
means wide-open, political debate. And such debate may portend, for those with
vested interests in the regulatory process, some loss of control or power. To the
Congress, on the other hand, the social power inherent in control over com-
munications channels assures that addressing the problem of the regulation of
cable television systems means grappling with important and difficult political
issues. But, after all, that is what the Congress is elected to do.
N.B. Since this article went to press, the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision in American
Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 35 P. & F. Radio Reg. 2d 1 (9th Cir., Sept. 16, 1975). The
court there specifically rejected the ACLU's argument that access channels should be regulated
as common carrier channels, notwithstanding the court's observation that access channels possess
technical characteristics that make their regulation as a common carrier possible. However,
the question of the FCC's jurisdiction was never addressed in the opinion. It was apparently
never argued that the FCC already regulates leased-access channels according to the basic
principles of common carrier regulation, and that, accordingly, FCC jurisdiction over them
might be questioned. Cf. text accompanying note 166, p. 172 supra.
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